A

VIEW

OF

LORD BOLINGBROKE'S

PHILOSOPHY;

In Four LETTERS to a FRIEND.

LETTER the THIRD.

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THE LIFE AND ADVENTURES

IN LONDON AND ENGLAND.

PHILOSOPHY

FOR BOTTLEHOLDERS

OF

ALE AND GIN.

V.

AN

APOLOGY

FOR

The *Two First Letters*:

Which may ſerve for

An INTRODUCTION

To the *Two Laſt*.

SOON after the publication of the two firſt of theſe Letters, I had the honour of an anonymous advertiſement, in the warmeſt terms of friendſhip lamenting the diſpleaſure, which my treatment of Lord Bolingbroke had given to that part of the *Public*, where the Advertiſer had an opportunity of making his obſervations.

There was in this friendly notice ſo many ſure marks of the Writer's regard to the Author of the *View*; ſo much good ſenſe, elegance, and weight of Authority in the compoſition; and the whole ſo ſuperior to every thing, but the force of plain and ſimple truth, that I had as much pleaſure in the honour of the monition, as I had real pain for the occaſion.

He aſſures me I ſhall never know from whence it came: ſo that when ſuch a Writer will remain unknown, it is as fooliſh as indecent, to pretend to gueſs.

Yet I am very confident that a hand ſo friendly could never intend, by keeping itſelf out of ſight, to deprive me of the means of vindicating my conduct to him, on this occaſion. I am rather inclined to think, that he took this way, to oblige me to convey my Apology to him,

him, which he had a right to expect, thro' the hands of *that* Public, which appear to have none: and which yet, I am perſuaded, it was his principal concern, I ſhould firſt ſatisfy. For I muſt inform my Reader, that the ſevere reflexions, I am about to quote, are not ſo properly his ſentiments, as the ſentiments of thoſe he is pleaſed to call the *Public*.

They are introduced in this manner: *I am grieved to the heart to find the reception your two Letters meet with from the World.*—I am very ſure he is; and ſo, I think, muſt every good man be; more for the ſake of *that* Public than for mine. For what muſt an indifferent perſon think of a Public, by profeſſion, Chriſtians, of ſo exceeding delicacy as to be leſs ſcandalized at three or four bulky volumes of red hot Impiety, becauſe they come from a

Lord, than at the cool contempt of that inſult, in a Defender of the Religion of his Country, becauſe he may be a poor prieſt or an ignoble layman? Will not every impartial man lament with me ſo abject a condition of things, as that, where *atheiſtic principles* give leſs offence to our politeneſs, than *ill manners*; and where, in good company, you may be better received with the plague-ſore upon you, than the itch?

It vexes me (ſays the anonymous writer) *to hear ſo many poſitively deciding that the Writer muſt be——by the* SCURRILITY *and abuſe.*—— The term is a little ſtrong. But the beſt is, it is one of thoſe words the *Public* think themſelves at liberty to apply indifferently, either to *ſcandalous abuſe* or to *honeſt reproof*, juſt as they happen to be diſpoſed to the Author, or the Subject. The equity of this kind of judgment, ſo readily

paſſed

paſſed upon Authors, has been ſufficiently exemplified in the caſe of one much more conſiderable than the Author of the *View*. The Author of the *Divine Legation of Moſes* compoſed a book in ſupport of Revelation: and ſenſible that the novelty of his argument would give the alarm, and bring down whole bands of Anſwerers upon him, he did all he could to invite fair quarter. He publickly engaged that a candid, ingenuous Adverſary ſhould never repent him of his civility. Anſwerers, as he foreſaw, aroſe in abundance: but not one who treated him with common good manners. Of about a hundred of theſe writers, One or two, and no more, he thought fit to anſwer; and, (who can wonder?) without much ceremony. This was in the heat of controverſy; when his reſentments were freſh, and the injury aggravated

by every circumſtance of malice and *ſcurrility*. Since that time, for many years together, he has ſeen them write on, in the very manner they began; and without any other marks of reſentment, than a contemptuous ſilence. Yet for all this, he could not eſcape the character of a *ſcurrilous and abuſive* Writer. It was in vain to appeal to his provocations then, or to his forbearance ever ſince.

But to return to the Author of the *View*. He was detected, it ſeems, by his *ſcurrility and abuſe*. Surely, there muſt be ſome miſtake; and his Lordſhip's dirt is imputed to him. The Author of the *View* ſeems to be in the caſe of a Scavanger, (his enemies, I hope, will not take offence at the compariſon) who may not indeed be overclean while at ſuch kind of work; but it would be hard to impute that ſtink

to

to him, which is not of his making, but removing.

The Letters are univerſally read; *and it is almoſt univerſally agreed that Lord Bolingbroke deſerved any treatment from you, both as a man perſonally ill uſed by him, and a member of that* ORDER, WHICH HE HAS TREATED IN THE LIKE MANNER:—

In a Law of Veſpaſian, we read, *Non oportere maledici Senatoribus*; *remaledici civile, faſque eſt.* And the equity of it my anonymous Friend ſeems to allow. But I will claim no benefit from the Authority of Veſpaſian, nor even from that which I more reverence, my kind Monitor's. The truth is, that nothing perſonal once entered into my thoughts while I was writing thoſe two letters. Had that been the caſe, it would rather have been the ſubject of my vanity, than reſentment. For nothing is more glorious

glorious than for an obſcure writer of theſe dark and cold days; to find himſelf treated in the ſame manner with the greateſt and moſt famous of the golden Ages of antient and modern Literature.

——*But* (ſays the anonymous letter) *it may diſhonour a Gentleman and a Clergyman to give him that treatment he deſerved, eſpecially after his death. It is falling into the* VERY FAULT *ſo juſtly objected to him: every body would have applauded your ſelecting thoſe inſtances of his railing, arrogance, and abuſe, had not you followed his example.* — This Public then takes it for granted, that treating a licentious Writer as he deſerves, may *diſhonour a Gentleman and a Clergyman.* Here, I think, a diſtinction is to be made; where the thing concerns only the civil intereſts of particulars, a *Gentleman* has but little provocation for unuſual ſeverity of language,

language, and leſs for perſonal reflexion. But where the higheſt of our religious intereſts are attacked, the intereſts not of this man, nor of that; not of this Community, or the other; but of our common Nature itſelf; and where the People are appealed to, and invited to judge, there, I think, every *Gentleman*, who loves his Religion and his Country, ſhould take the quarrel on himſelf, and repel the inſult with all his vigour.

" When TRUTH or VIRTUE an affront
" endures,
" Th' affront is mine, my Friend, and
" ſhould be yours.

The manners of a *Clergyman*, if they are to be diſtinguiſhed from thoſe of a *Gentleman*, conſiſt in Zeal for God, and Charity towards Man. The occaſion will ſometimes call out one, ſometimes the other: they may

may be exerted ſeparately, but never at one another's expence. When they are ſo, all goes wrong, for they are made by Nature to act together for the common good: As in the caſe before us, I preſume to ſay, a zeal for God is the greateſt Charity to Man.

Now when Doctrines of that kind, which the *View of L. Bolingbroke's Philoſophy* expoſes, riſe to their extreme, not to confute them in terms either of horror or ridicule, for fear of tranſgreſſing the civil maxims of politeneſs, would be like that *Dean*, the Poet ſpeaks of, who ſcrupled to mention *Hell* before his audience at Court.

If then, amongſt the Chriſtian duties, there be, on ſome occaſions, a force to be exerted to repel the Inſulters of Religion, as well as, on others, a patience to be obſerved, in compaſſion to the ſim-

ply

ply erroneous; and that this before us was not the time; I desire to know when that time comes? When men are sincere in their mistakes, after a diligent and candid search; when the subject is of small moment, such as the mode of discipline, the measure of conformity, or a distinction in Metaphysics; the mistaken, and even the perverse should be treated with tenderness. But when the avowed end of a Writer is the destruction of Religion in all its forms; when the means he employs, are every trick of prevarication, and ill faith, and every term of scurrility and abuse; when, to use the expression of Cicero, *est inter nos non de* terminis, *sed de* tota possessione *contentio*, Then a practised calmness, and affected management, look like betraying the cause we are intrusted to defend; or, what is almost as ill, like defending

ing it in that way which may turn moſt to our own advantage. As when, in queſtions of the greateſt moment, we comply with this *faſhionable indifference*, or flatter the *indifference* into a Virtue, while we ſhould have ſtriven to rekindle the dying ſparks of Religion by a vigorous colliſion with its more hardened Enemies.

Men who have had Chriſtianity indeed at heart have never been diſpoſed, in capital caſes like this, to ſpare or manage the Offenders. When the incomparable STILLINGFLEET undertook to expoſe the enormity of the Court of Rome, in turning the *diſpenſation of the word* into a lucrative trade, he proſecuted the controverſy with ſo much vigour of ſtyle and ſentiment as to be called by thoſe who found themſelves affected by it, *Buffoon* and *Comedian*. And of late, when a learned perſon had,

had, with juſt indignation, expoſed the horrid enormities of the *Moravian Brethren*, he received this anſwer for his pains, to be ſure, equally apt and ſatisfactory, *The ſervant of the Lord muſt not ſtrive, but be gentle unto all men; in meekneſs inſtructing thoſe who oppoſe themſelves.* Without queſtion, debauched and impious men would be much at their eaſe, when, ſecure from the reſentment of the *Magiſtrate*, they find they have nothing to fear from the indignation of the *Learned*.

But this leads me to another conſideration, which may further juſtify the Author of the *View*, in the account he has given of this atrocious Enemy of RELIGION and SOCIETY.

The Engliſh Government, ſecure in the divinity of that Religion which it hath eſtabliſhed, and jealous of that Liberty which at ſo much

much expence it hath procured, with a becoming conſciouſneſs of the ſuperiority of Truth, hath thought fit to ſuffer this, and many other writings, (tho' none ſo criminal in the *manner*,) to paſs thro' the Preſs, into the hands of the People: Writings, in which not only the Inſtitutions of poſitive and national Worſhip have been inſulted, but likewiſe thoſe very PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL RELIGION, which hitherto have been eſteemed the firſt bond of civil Society, as being thoſe only which can inforce obedience for conſcience ſake. A bond, which no Nation under heaven but our own will ever ſuffer to be publicly brought in queſtion: becauſe no Nation beſides has an equal confidence in *Truth*, and an equal Zeal for *Liberty*.

But do flagitious Writers therefore become more ſacred or reſpect-

able for this impunity? On the contrary, is there not the greater need that thoſe evils, which the Public cannot redreſs, ſhould at leaſt be oppoſed and checked by a private hand? Why do the civil Laws of all other Nations interfere to puniſh theſe offenders, but to prevent the miſchiefs their writings do amongſt the Populace? Why are not theſe Laws *put in execution* here, but from the experience, or, at leaſt, from a foreſight, that a recourſe to them has been, or may prove, injurious to public Liberty? However, the *end*, we ſee, is important, tho' *theſe means* may ſeem incommodious. Nothing is left then, but to employ others. What they are, the very caſe points out to us. The miſchief theſe Writers do amongſt the People is by their credit with them. If this credit be undeſerved, the way lies open for the Defender of Re-

ligion to leſſen it, either by tragical complaints or Ridicule. The Author of the *View* choſe the latter. He thought it more effectual; for now a days, Folly diſcredits more than Impiety: He thought it more generous; for he had no deſign of bringing in the Magiſtrate to ſecond his arguments. Nor is he one of thoſe impertinents who are for directing Authority, or think there is any need of ſuch as him,

" To virtue's work to urge the tardy Hall,
" Or goad the Prelate ſlumb'ring in his Stall.

He rather thinks it becomes him to follow their example. The Convocation, in their late addreſs to his Majeſty, *lament the depravity of our times, evidenced beyond all former examples, by the publication of writings which ſtrike at the very vitals of all Religion and ſhake the foundations of civil Government.* Yet they are ſo far

far from throwing the ſcandal on the State, or calling out upon the civil Magiſtrate, that, as if they even reſpected the ſlander of their Enemies, *they engage themſelves to his Majeſty to exert themſelves to the utmoſt, to maintain the honour of our moſt holy faith.* Let no one therefore take offence, that a private man has adventured to lend his hand to what the whole body of the Clergy has, with ſo much glory to themſelves, engaged to ſupport.

But his Lordſhip's *death* is a further objection to the manner in which he is treated. Had theſe *Eſſays* been publiſhed during his life, and had the Author of the *View* deferred his remarks upon them, in expectation of this good time, the cenſure might appear to have its weight. But what ſhall we ſay, if his Lordſhip was publicly invited to give *his Philoſophy* to

the world, by the promiſe of a ſpeedy anſwer? If a Writer's death may ſcreen his Works from the treatment they would deſerve in his life time, he has a very effectual way to ſecure both his Perſon and his Principles, from diſgrace. Yet, where this is mentioned as an aggravation, it is confeſſed that, in theſe poſthumous Works, publiſhed by his Lordſhip's direction, the Author of the *View* is abuſed in the groſſeſt terms. Now what is ſaid to the diſcredit of a living Writer, eſpecially by one of his Lordſhip's Authority in politics and letters, might prove a ſubſtantial injury: The harm to a dead Writer is but fantaſtic.—This is only ſaid to ſhew, that, had the Author of the *View* retaliated, as he never had it in his thoughts to do, the return had been ſtill much ſhort of the provocation.

But

But He commits the VERY FAULT *objected to Lord Bolingbroke — and in ſelecting the inſtances of his railing and arrogance he follows his Lordſhip's* EXAMPLE. —— This would be weighed. Lord Bolingbroke has, in the moſt contemptuous manner, reviled almoſt all the Wiſe and Virtuous of antient and modern times. He has railed at the primitive Saints, the modern Doctors, the whole body of the Chriſtian Clergy; and, in a word, the whole race of Mankind; which, ever ſince Religion came amongſt them, deſerve to be conſidered in no other light than as one great aggregate of Lunatics. He has abuſed *Moſes* and *Paul*; he has ridiculed the SON, and blaſphemed the FATHER. Here is another Writer, *who by his ſcurrility and abuſe is judged no other than* —— and what has he done? *He has fallen into the ſame fault, and followed his example.*

What, has he likewiſe *railed* at all the Good, the Virtuous, and the Pious? Has he likewiſe had the *arrogance* to ſay, that the World was one great Bedlam? Has he likewiſe blaſphemed his Creator and Redeemer? Alaſs, no. Two ſuch Writers are too much for any one age! And yet, what leſs can juſtify Men in ſaying, that the Author of the *View* has *fallen into the ſame fault with Lord Bolingbroke, and followed his example?* All he has done is occaſionally telling the World, That his Lordſhip, once in his life, was for bringing in *Popery* and the *Pretender*; and is now for introducing *Naturaliſm*, a more ſpecious form of Atheiſm: that he is overrun with paſſion and prejudice: that he underſtands little or nothing of the ſubjects he handles, which yet he treats with ſovereign contempt: that his learning is ſuperficial, his reaſoning ſophi-

ſophiſtical, and his declamation inflated: and that, if ever Religion ſhould happen to regain its hold on the People, his *Philoſophic* works will run the hazard of being applied to the loweſt and *vileſt uſes*. This is the ſubſtance of what he has ſaid. And if this be falling into the *ſame fault, and following his Lordſhip's example*, the Author of the *View*, for ought I can perceive, muſt be content to plead guilty.

But we will ſuppoſe, the *manner* of writing, and not the *ſubject* of the Work, is here to be underſtood. Is the railing at all mankind, at all Religion, at God Almighty himſelf, but of the ſame ſpecies of writing with His, who ſhall tell the world, that this Railer was once as much an Enemy to the *Civil*, as now to the *Religious* Conſtitution of his Country; that he reaſons ill, and that he declaims worſe? Did the

politeneſs of a *Gentleman* or a *Clergyman* require, under pain of being matched with his Lordſhip in *railing* and *arrogance*, that, after the Author of the *View* had quoted all his Lordſhip's horrors in *principle* and *expreſſion*, he ſhould have added, " This, good People, is the " FIRST PHILOSOPHY, which is to " be ſubſtituted amongſt us, in the " place of RELIGION. But take " me along with you; Tho' this, " indeed, be the bane and poiſon " of your HOPES; tho' it reduce " humanity to the moſt diſconſo- " late and forlorn condition, by de- " priving it of the MORAL Ruler of " the World, and by diſſolving all " the ties of CIVIL Government; " Yet, Courage! The Author was a " man of diſtinguiſhed quality, of " uncommon abilities, and of infi- " nite politeneſs. His great talents " for *Buſineſs* enabled him to ſee

" what

" what was beſt for Society; his
" penetration into *Philoſophic* mat-
" ters, what was beſt for human
" Nature; and his profound know-
" ledge of *Divinity*, what was beſt
" for Both. He had governed
" States; he had inſtructed Kings;
" and this laſt great Book of Wiſ-
" dom was the reſult of all his ſkill
" and experience."

All this, indeed, I might have ſaid: and, it is probable, a good deal of it I ſhould have ſaid, had the aim of my *View* been to recommend myſelf, and to raiſe a reputation from the defeat of this mighty Man. Had this, I ſay, been my aim, the raiſing the character of an adverſary who was preſently to fall by my hand, would hardly have been amongſt the laſt of my contrivances. But as I had another purpoſe, the preventing the miſchiefs of his Book, I took the different

method of reducing his Authority its to juſt value; which, by having been over-rated, had prepared the way for the eaſy reception of his Opinions amongſt a corrupt People.

The Letters, ſay *this* Public, (whoſe ſentiments have been ſo kindly conveyed unto me) *purport to be a View of Lord Bolingbroke's Philoſophy. They are a view of his life, morals, politics, and converſation. It may be true and juſt. But that is not the queſtion. Whether he made a good treaty, or wrote the Craftsman, neither concludes for, nor againſt, the divinity of the Chriſtian Religion.*

I readily confeſs, had Lord Bolingbroke's *Morals* and *Politics* nothing to do with his *religious Principles*, I had acted both an invidious and an idle part to bring in his *Treaties* and his *Craftsmen* into a *View of his Philoſophy*. But I held all theſe

to be the various parts of the ſame Syſtem, which had contributed, in ſupport of one another, to produce a Whole.——I can believe he found it for his eaſe in retirement, to adhere ſtill *cloſer* to a ſet of Principles, which having facilitated his Practice, enabled him to bear the retroſpect of it: but I am much miſtaken if he did not begin the World with his notions of *God* and the *Soul*; hence his rounds of buſineſs and amuſements.

" Now all for pleaſure; now for Church and
" State.

The reſt followed in courſe. For, as Tully obſerves, *Cum enim* DECRETUM *proditur, Lex veri rectique proditur: quo a vitio et* AMICITIARUM *proditiones, et* RERUM PUBLICARUM, *naſci ſolent.*

But this is not all. I beg leave to ſay, there was not only a *cloſe*

connexion between his Principles and his Practice, but that it was neceſſary to a juſt defence of Religion againſt him, to *take notice* of that connexion.

One of his Lordſhip's pretended purpoſes, in his Philoſophic *Eſſays*, was to detect the Corruptions which the CLERGY have brought into the Chriſtian Religion: My aim, in the *View*, was to expoſe a ſpecies of Impiety which overturns all Religion.

Conſider, how his Lordſhip proceeded.——Not that I place my juſtification on his example: that, indeed, would be confirming the charge I am here endeavouring to refute; neither would I inſiſt upon the right of retaliation; for, tho' that be a better plea, it is the laſt which a Writer for Truth would have recourſe to. I quote his Lordſhip's method, as that which right reaſon preſcribes to all, who undertake to

detect and lay open error and deceit.

His Lordſhip's point, as we ſaid, was to ſhew, that the Clergy had corrupted the purity and ſimplicity of Religion. It is not my purpoſe here to inquire with what ingenuity he has repreſented the Fact, or how juſtly he has deduced the Conſequences, which, he pretends, have riſen from it. He has ſhewn ſome corruptions; he has imagined more; and dreſſed up the reſt of his catalogue out of his own invention; all which, he moſt unreaſonably offers as a legitimate prejudice againſt Religion itſelf. Well, be it ſo, that the Clergy are convicted of abuſe and impoſture. The queſtion, which every one is ready to aſk, who thinks himſelf concerned to enquire into the truth of the fact, is, CUI BONO? What end had the Clergy to ſerve by theſe corruptions? His Lordſhip thinks

thinks the queſtion reaſonable; and is as ready to reply, That they had a wicked antichriſtian Tyranny to impoſe upon the necks of Mankind: in order to which, they contrived to introduce ſuch kind of corruptions into Religion as beſt tended to pervert men's underſtandings, to intimidate their wills, and to impreſs upon their conſciences, an awe and reverence for their ſpiritual Maſters. The anſwer is ſatisfactory, and ſhews the uſe of this method in detecting error. With his rhetorical exaggerations, with the extenſion of his liſt of corruptions, with his ridiculous inferences, I have, at preſent, no concern.

Now, as the Author of the *Eſſays* had a tyrannical Hierarchy to unmaſk; ſo, the Author of the *View* had a declared, an impious, an outrageous Enemy of all Religion to expoſe. His Lordſhip had publicly

and

and openly, in his reſpectable Character of a NOBLEMAN, a STATESMAN, and a PHILOSOPHER, declared it to be all a Cheat, ſupported only by Knaves and Madmen; which indeed was a large Party, ſince, by his own account, it takes in the whole body of Mankind. His Lordſhip had been held up to the People as an *all accompliſhed* Perſonage, full and complete in every endowment of civil and moral Wiſdom: And the enchanting vehicle in which his triumphant character was conveyed, had made it received, even againſt the information of their ſenſes. Now a Public thus prejudiced, would, on ſuch a repreſentation of his Lordſhip's religious principles as the *Eſſays* contain, and the *View* collects together, be ready to aſk "could ſo ſublime a Genius be diſpoſed to deprive himſelf, and us, of all thoſe bleſſings which Religion promiſes,

had

had he not diſcovered, and been perfectly aſſured, that the whole was a deluſion; and therefore in pity to Mankind, had broke the Charm, which kept them from ſeeing their *preſent geod*, in fond expectation of a recompence in the ſhadowy regions of *futurity?* We ſay, *deprive himſelf*, for he ſeems ſufficiently vext, and ſenſible of his diſappointment, when waked from the pleaſing dream of a life to come. *There is no one thought* (ſays his Lordſhip) *which ſooths my mind like this: I encourage my* IMAGINATION *to purſue it, and am heartily afflicted when* ANOTHER FACULTY *of the intellect comes boiſterouſly in, and* WAKES *me from ſo pleaſing a dream, if it be a dream*[1]."—In this manner I ſuppoſed, that they, for whoſe uſe the *View* was intended, were diſpoſed to argue; I mean that part

[1] xliii Letter to Swift in Pope's Works Vol. ix.

of

of them who yet retain any concern for another life; and who have not thrown off, together with their Guides, all thoughts of their journey thither. Now, againſt ſo dangerous a prejudice, the Defender of Religion was to provide. He was firſt to remove their deluſion concerning Lord Bolingbroke's Philoſophic Character; and to ſhew, that he had none of thoſe talents of Reaſoning, Learning, or Philoſophy which are neceſſary to qualify a man in deciding on this important queſtion. But this oppoſed only one half of their prejudices. They could by no means be brought to think that ſo good a Man, ſo benevolent a Citizen, ſo warm a friend to Mankind, as his Lordſhip's *Eſſays* repreſent him, could be lightly willing to forego that great bond of Society, that great ſupport of humanity, RELIGION. The advocate

of Religion therefore, unleſs he would betray his cauſe, was obliged to ſhew, that the Social light, in which his Lordſhip puts himſelf, and in which he had been placed by his poetical Friend, was a falſe one; that his moral virtues were an exact tally to his religious principles; and *public* virtue (according to his favorite *Cicero)* embracing and comprehending all the private, *omnes omnium Charitates* PATRIA *una complexa eſt*, it was to the purpoſe of ſuch a defence, to ſhew, that his Lordſhip had been a BAD CITIZEN. Now tho' Religion has the ſtrongeſt allurements for the Good and Virtuous, it has its terrors, and thoſe very dreadful too, for the Wicked: Who, in ſuch circumſtances, have but this for their relief, Either to part with their Vices, or their Religion. All the world knows His Lordſhip's choice. He himſelf tells us, it was

made

made on the conviction of Reaſon; others think, by the inducement of his Paſſions. The World is to determine; but they ſhould judge with a knowledge of the caſe. And this, the Author of the *View* preſented to them, in anſwer to the latter part of theſe popular prejudices; which would not ſuffer them to conceive any other cauſe but rational conviction, that could induce any man in his ſenſes to part with the *ſoothing* conſolation of futurity, as his Lordſhip is pleaſed to call it.

And now, I ſuppoſe, every candid Reader will allow, at leaſt I am ſure the candid Writer of the anonymous Letter will allow, that his Lordſhip's *morals* and *politics* come within the *view of his Philoſophy*; where the queſtion is of the TRUTH or FALSHOOD of Religion; and of his Lordſhip's AUTHORITY concerning it.

To ſum up this Argument: His Lordſhip deſcants on *Romiſh Superſtition*; the Author of the *View*, on *his Lordſhip's Philoſophy*: Not to ſhew for what *end* the one was eſtabliſhed, or by what cauſes the other was produced, is relating Facts without head or tail; which the Writer on *the uſe of hiſtory* juſtly throws into the claſs of unprofitable things: and therefore his Lordſhip, ſpeaking of the corruptions brought by the Clergy, into religion, accounts for them by a ſpirit of Dominion; and the Author of the *View* ſpeaking of his Lordſhip's *religious principles*, reminds the Reader of his *moral practice*; but ſo far only as was to the purpoſe, and was notorious to all mankind.

Lord Bolingbroke (ſays this Public) *deſerved every thing of you; but who are thoſe friends and admirers of his, whom you repreſent applauding all he wrote; whom you bring in unneceſſarily*

rily upon many occaſions. I dare ſay, they are very few. You had better have named them.

As exceptionable as that, perhaps, might have been, I ſhould certainly have choſe to do ſo, had I conceived it poſſible for the Reader to underſtand, by ſuch *friends and admirers*, any of thoſe few illuſtrious Perſons, whom Lord Bolingbroke's politeneſs, his diſtance from buſineſs, his knowledge of the world, and, above all, his ambition to be admired, occaſionally brought into his acquaintance; and who gave dignity and reputation to his retirement. Several of theſe, I have the honour to know, and the pleaſure of being able to inform thoſe who do not, that they were ſo far from being in the principles of his *Philoſophy*, that ſome of them did not ſo much as know what they were; and thoſe who did, let him underſtand, how much they deteſted them.

Which very well explains the diſpoſition of his Will concerning thoſe papers, in which his *Philoſophy* is contained. And if it was no more than for the ſake of this fair opportunity of explaining myſelf, I could readily excuſe all the hard thoughts *this public* ſeems to have entertained of me. As to the *friends and admirers, who applauded all he wrote,* I meant thoſe who perſuaded him to change his mind, and give thoſe *Eſſays* to the Public, which he had over and over declared were only for the ſecret inſpection of a Few. And he ſeems willing the World ſhould know to whom it was indebted for this benefit, by his letting thoſe places in his *Eſſays* ſtand, where he declares his own opinion of their *unfitneſs* for general communication.

But what grieves and hurts your friends moſt (ſays this Public) *is ſtill behind. Poor Pope did not deſerve*

to

to be treated by you with ſo much cruelty, contempt, and injuſtice. In a work where Lord Bolingbroke is repreſented as a Monſter, hated both of God and Man, why is Pope always and unneceſſarily brought in, only as his friend and admirer? Why as approving of, and privy to all that was addreſſed to him? Why ſhould he, who had many great talents, and amiable qualities, be deſcribed only by the ſlighting Epithets of tuneful *and* poetical — *You ſay, Pope* announced the glad tidings of all theſe things. *In what work can he be ſaid to have done it, except in his* Eſſay on Man? *This is throwing a reflexion on the excellent* Commentary *on that* Eſſay.

Who it was that *treated poor Pope with cruelty, contempt, and injuſtice,* Lord Bolingbroke, or the Author of the *View*, let my Cenſurers judge; and, by their freedom from paſſion and reſentment, at a time when a

friend would be moſt *hurt*, they appear perfectly qualified to judge impartially.

When, on his publication of the *Patriot King*, Lord Bolingbroke did indeed uſe the memory of poor Pope, with exceeding *contempt*, *cruelty*, *and injuſtice*, by repreſenting him, in the *Advertiſement* to the Public, as a buſy ignorant interpolator of his works, a mercenary betrayer of his truſt, a miſerable, who bartered all the friendſhip of his Philoſopher and Guide, for a little paltry gain, Who was it then that manifeſted his *hurt and grief for poor Pope?* Was it *this Public?* Or was it the *Author of the Letter to Lord Bolingbroke on that occaſion?*

But in what conſiſts the *contempt*, *cruelty*, *and injuſtice* of the *View?* The *contempt* is in the *ſlighting epithets of tuneful and poetical:* the *Cruelty* in giving inſtances of Pope's unbound-

unbounded admiration of Lord Bolingbroke; and the *injuſtice* in ſaying that he denounced the *glad tidings of the firſt Philoſophy*, and that he approved and was *privy to all that was addreſſed to him.*

My uſing the epithets of *tuneful and poetical*, in ſpeaking of a man who had many ſuperior qualities, was, I humbly conceive, well ſuited to the occaſion. It is where I ſpeak of Pope as an idolatrous admirer of Lord Bolingbroke: and they aptly inſinuate what I would have them mean, that, Judgment had there nothing to do; but all was to be placed to the friendly extravagance of a poetical *imagination*. Who could fairly gather more from it, than that my intention was to place his Lordſhip's *gratitude*, and Mr. Pope's *idolatry* ſide by ſide, in order to their ſetting off one another. But *cruelty* is added to contempt, in the *inſtances* I give of Pope's unbounded

bounded admiration. I am verily perſuaded, had Pope lived to ſee Lord Bolingbroke's returns of friendſhip, as well in his Lordſhip's uſual converſation, as in the *advertiſement to the Patriot King*, he would have been amongſt the firſt to have laughed at his own deluſions, when this treatment of him had once broken and diſſolved the charm; at leaſt, he would have been ready to laugh with a friend, who ſhould chuſe to turn them into ridicule. For he held this to be amongſt the offices of friendſhip, to laugh at your friend's foibles till you brought him to laugh with you,

" Laugh at your Friends; and if your Friends
" be ſore,
" So much the better, you may laugh the
" more.

as implying, that, while they continued *ſore*, they continued to ſtand in need of this friendly ſurgery.

My *injuſtice* conſiſts in ſuppoſing *Pope was privy to all that was addreſſed to him.* A great injuſtice indeed, had I ſo inſinuated, I, who with greater certainty than moſt men, can affirm, that he was privy to nothing of the ſecret, but the deſign of the addreſs, and the preliminary diſcourſes. So little did Pope know of the principles of the *firſt Philoſophy*, that when a common acquaintance, in his laſt illneſs, chanced to tell him of a late converſation with Lord Bolingbroke, in which his Lordſhip took occaſion to deny God's moral attributes, as they are commonly underſtood, he was ſo ſhocked that he reſted not till he had aſked Lord Bolingbroke whether his informer was not miſtaken? His Lordſhip aſſured him, he was; of which, Pope with great ſatisfaction informed his Friend. Under this ignorance of his Lordſhip's real ſentiments it was,

that

that Pope gave eaſy credit to him, when he vapoured, that *he would demonſtrate all the common Metaphyſics to be wicked and abominable* [2]. Which leads me to that part of the charge, where it is ſaid, I could only mean the ESSAY ON MAN, by the *glad tidings of the firſt Philoſophy*. I meant a very different thing; and alluded to the following paſſages in his LETTERS. *Do not laugh at my gravity, but permit me to wear the beard of a Philoſopher, till I pull it off, and make a jeſt of it myſelf. 'Tis juſt what my Lord Bolingbroke is doing with* METAPHYSICS. *I hope you will live to ſee, and ſtare at the learned figure he will make on the ſame ſhelf with Locke and Malebranche* [3]. And again, *Lord Bolingbroke is voluminous, but he is voluminous only to deſtroy Volumes. I ſhall not live, I fear, to ſee that work printed* [4]. Where,

[2] *Bolingbroke to Swift*, Letter xlviii. Vol. ix.
[3] Letters lxxi. Vol. ix. [4] Letter lxxiii.

by

by the way, his fancy that theſe METAPHYSICS were deſigned for the public, ſhews he knew nothing of the contents. This then was what I meant: The *Eſſay on Man* I could not mean. For in the 80th page of the *View*, I make the fundamental doctrines of that *Poem* and his Lordſhip's *Eſſays* to be directly oppoſite to one another. "*Mr.* POPE'S *Eſ-*
"*ſay on Man* is a real vindication of
"Providence againſt Libertines and
"Atheiſts—Lord BOLINGBROKE'S
"*Eſſays* are a pretended vindication
"of Providence againſt an imagina-
"ry confederacy between Divines and
"Atheiſts—The Poet directs his
"Argument againſt Atheiſts and
"Libertines in ſupport of RELIGION;
"The Philoſopher againſt Divines
"in ſupport of NATURALISM: and
"the ſucceſs is anſwerable. Pope's
"argument is manly, ſyſtematical,
"and convincing: Lord Boling-
broke's

" broke's, confuſed, prevaricating,
" and inconſiſtent."

Thus I have explained, in the beſt way I am able, my reaſons for ſpeaking of Pope in a manner which gives offence. But what ſhall we ſay, if this air of negligence to his memory was aſſumed, the better to conceal the Author of an anonymous Epiſtle? The motive ſure was allowable; tho' the project was without effect: for *this Public* has poſitively decided, that *the Author muſt be—by the ſcurrility and abuſe.*

But, continues the Cenſurer, *Had you purſued the advantage you have ingeniouſly taken from an expreſſion in one of Pope's Letters, to have ſhewn that Pope differed from Bolingbroke where he was in the wrong; that he not only condemned but deſpiſed the futility of his reaſoning againſt Revelation; that where he was right Pope improved but never ſervilely copied*

his

his Ideas, you would have done honour to your Friend and yourself: you would have ſerved the cauſe of Religion: you would have diſcredited Lord Bolingbroke the more by the contraſt——

Now all this, in the *fourth Letter*, I have done: And the Reader will find it in its place. In the mean time, every body might ſee I was ready, on a fit occaſion, to do it, by the paſſage quoted juſt above, from the *ſecond*, where *Pope is honoured, and Lord Bolingbroke the more diſcredited by the contraſt.*

But I muſt not leave this head without taking notice of one expreſſion in the cenſure. It is ſaid, that the *View* REPRESENTS *L. Bolingbroke as a Monſter hated both of God and Man.* The expreſſion had been juſter, if, inſtead of this, the writer had ſaid, *from the View it may be collected*; becauſe, whatever ideas

ideas of his Lordſhip may ariſe in men's minds on a peruſal of the *View*, they ariſe from his Lordſhip's own words, which are faithfully quoted: What the Author of the *View* adds, is only a little wholeſome raillery, which can preſent the Reader with no idea but what (in the opinion of *Pope*) ariſes from every fruitleſs attempt of Impiety.

" Heav'n ſtill with *laughter* the vain toil
" ſurveys,
" And buries madmen in the heaps they raiſe.

That the Author of the *View* aſſiſted in the dreſſing up ſo ſtrange a ſight, as *a Monſter hated both by God and Man*, was very far from his intention. He made a ſcruple of accompanying his Lordſhip's quotations with thoſe reflexions of ſerious indignation which ſuch a Scene of horrors naturally ſuggeſt, leſt he ſhould be thought to aim at ſomething more than critical animadverſion.

verſion. He therefore generouſly endeavoured to turn the public attention from the *horror*, to the *ridicule*, of the *firſt Philoſophy*, and to get his Lordſhip well laughed at, as being perſuaded that when the Public is brought to that temper, its reſentment ſeldom riſes to extremes.

Men had better ſpeak out, and ſay, the Author of the *View* ought to have repreſented L. Bolingbroke as neither *deteſtable*, nor *ridiculous*. He could have wiſhed, that his ſenſe of honour and duty would have permitted him ſo to do. The Author of the *View* is no Fanatic or Enthuſiaſt, and perhaps leſs of a Bigot than either. Yet there are times and occaſions when the ſobereſt thinker will confeſs, that the intereſts of Particulars ſhould give way to thoſe of the Public. It is true, there are others, when politeneſs, civil prudence, and the pri-

vate motives of Friendſhip, ought to determine a man, who is to live in the world, to comply with the ſtate and condition of the times; and even to chuſe the worſe, inſtead of the better method of doing good. But my misfortune was that this did not appear to be one of thoſe occaſions, in which, when I had explained the Doctrines and Opinions of an erroneous Writer, I could leave them with this reflexion: "Theſe are the "writer's notions on the moſt im-"portant points which regard hu-"man happineſs. They are indeed "very ſingular and novel. But then "conſider, the Writer was a great "man, and high in all the attain-"ments of Wiſdom; therefore weigh "well and reverendly, before you "condemn what I have here expoſed "to your Judgment." But had I ſaid this, would it have ſecured me from OFFENCE? The thing of all, to be moſt dreaded by thoſe who know

the world. Would it not rather have furniſhed *another* handle to the ſame Cenſurers, of making me a confederate in his guilt, only a little better diſguiſed. This would not have been the firſt time I had been ſo ſerved, when endeavouring to avoid offence.

And yet there was but one of theſe three ways; either to laugh, to declaim, or to ſay nothing. I choſe the *firſt*, as what I fancied leaſt obnoxious; in which, however, I was miſtaken;—and as moſt likely to do good; in which, I hope, I am not miſtaken.

The only harm L. Bolingbroke can do, whoſe reputation of parts and wiſdom had been raiſed ſo high, is amongſt the PEOPLE. His objections againſt Religion are altogether of the popular kind, as we feel by the effects they have had, when uſed by their original Authors, long

before his Lordſhip honored them with a place in his *Eſſays*. What then was he to do, whoſe buſineſs it was to put a ſpeedy ſtop to the miſchief, and neither to palliate the doctrines, nor to compliment the Author of them, but to give a true and ſuccinct repreſentation of his *Syſtem*, in a popular way; to make a right uſe of that abundance, which the ESSAYS and FRAGMENTS afforded, to ſhew that his Lordſhip's *Principles* were as fooliſh as they were wicked; and that the *arguments* uſed in ſupport of them were as weak as they were bold and overbearing: that he was a pretender in matters of Learning and Philoſophy; and knew juſt as much of the genius of the Goſpel, as of that pretended corruption of it, which he calls, *artificial Theology*. This I imagined the only way to reach his Lordſhip's AUTHORITY, on which

all depended; and then the very weakeſt effort of ridicule would be able to do the reſt. Theſe were my motives for the method I took; and whatever impropriety there may be in divulging them in a way that tends to defeat their end, it ſhould, I think, be laid to the account of thoſe who made this explanation neceſſary.

I have been the longer on this matter as it will ſerve for an anſwer to what follows.

Lord Bolingbroke (ſays this Public) *is ſo univerſally and ſo juſtly obnoxious to all ſorts and ranks of people, that, from regard to him, no body cares how he is treated, but be aſſured your manner has deſtroyed all the merit of the work.*----To the *manner* I have ſaid enough. The candid Reader, I am ſure, will allow me to add a word or two *Concerning the effect of an unacceptable manner, in a work of public ſervice.* It had, till of late,

been always esteemed matter of merit to do a general good, tho' the *manner* of doing it might not be so readily approved. But we are now become so delicate and fastidious, that it is the *manner of doing*, even in things of the highest importance, which carries away all the praise. And yet, this false delicacy on a question of no less moment than Whether we shall have any Religion or none at all, seems as ridiculous, as it would be in a Great man to take offence at an officious neighbour for saving his falling Palace, by a few homely props near at hand, when he should have considered of a support more conformable to the taste and general style of Architecture, in my Lord's superb piece; or to find him disconcerted by that charitable hand, which should venture to pull his Grandeur by head and shoulders out of his flaming apartment.

But

But in theſe ſuppoſitions I grant much more than in reaſon I ought. I ſuppoſe the public taſte, which the *manner* in queſtion has offended, is founded in Nature; whereas 'tis the creature of Faſhion, and as ſhifting and fantaſtic as its Parent. TRUTH, which makes the *matter* of every honeſt man's enquiry, is eternal; but the *manner ſuited to the public taſte*, is nothing elſe than conformity to our preſent paſſions, or ſentiments; our prejudices, or diſpoſitions. When the truths or the practices of Religion have got poſſeſſion of a People, then a warmth for its intereſts, and an abhorrence of its Enemies, become the public taſte; and men expect to find the zeal of an Apoſtle in every defender of Religion: But when this awful Power has loſt its hold, when, at beſt, it floats but in the brain, and comes not near the heart, then, if you expect

to be read with approbation, you muſt conform your *manner* to that polite indifference, and eaſy uncon-cern, with which we ſee every other trial of ſkill plaid before us.

Nor is this the worſt. It has brought in uſe a new kind of political Arithmetic, which proceeds upon very unexpected methods of calcula-tion; where the leſſer ſum of an *unacceptable manner* ſhall do more than ſtrike off the infinitely larger of *important ſervices*; it ſhall turn them to demerit: while a long ac-cumulation of well ranged *inoffenſive cyphers* may be made to riſe to mil-lions.

Indeed (ſays this Public) *it*, [your manner] *has furniſhed your enemies with a handle to do you infinite miſ-chief. Your* COLD *friends lament and make the worſt ſort of excuſe, by im-puting it to a temper contracted from the long habit of drawing blood in con-troverſy;*

troverſy; Your WARM *friends are out of countenance, and forced to be ſilent, or turn the diſcourſe.*

Would not any one by this imagine, that the Author of the *View*, after much pretended oppoſition to Infidelity, was at laſt detected of being in combination with it, and all along artfully advancing its interests; that the maſk had unwarily dropt off, and that he ſtood confeſſed what Lord Bolingbroke has been pleaſed to call him, *an Advocate for civil and eccleſiaſtical Tyranny*. At leaſt, no one would imagine, that this *handle afforded to his enemies of doing him infinite miſchief*, was no other than the treating the Author of the moſt impious and inſulting book that ever affronted public juſtice, as a bad reaſoner and a worſe Philoſopher, whoſe VANITY led him to abuſe every *Name* of Learning, and his FEAR to diſcredit every *mode* of Religion.

Theſe

Theſe *cold Friends* however acted their parts as uſual; the great ſecret of which is, the well poiſoning an apology, or, as the anonymous writer better expreſſes it, *making the very worſt excuſe they can find.* But here, tho' they aimed well, they over-ſhot themſelves. This compliment *of drawing blood in controverſy*, the Author of the *View* takes to himſelf with great complacency. For his *Controverſy* having always lain in a quarter very remote from political altercation, either for or againſt Miniſters or Factions; and on no leſs a queſtion than the truth and honour of Religion, with Infidels and Bigots, the *drawing blood* ſhews him to have been *in earneſt*, which is no vulgar praiſe. It would be but poor commendation, I ween, of a brave Engliſh Veteran who had ſeen many a well-fought field for Liberty and his Country, to ſay, he never *drew blood*;

blood; tho' ſuch a compliment might recommend the humanity of a Champion at Hockley hole. When the ſituation of the times have engaged two learned Men, at the head of oppoſite parties, to engage in a mock fight, and play a prize of diſputation, with the reward placed, and often divided, between them, it is no wonder if there ſhould be much ceremony, and little *blood ſhed*. But the Author of the *View* writes for no Party, or party-opinions; he writes for what he thinks the TRUTH; and, in the point in queſtion, for the CLERGY, its Miniſters; both of which, (by good fortune, being yet of public Authority) he thinks himſelf at liberty to ſupport, tho' it be by *drawing blood* from premeditated impiety, from low envy, or malicious bigotry; which, he apprehends, are not to be ſubdued by management or a feigned attack. Yet

as

as much *in earneſt* as he is, he ſhould be aſhamed to turn the ſame arms againſt ſimple error, againſt a naked adverſary, or againſt the man who had thrown away his weapons; or, indeed, againſt any but him who ſtands up boldly to defy Religion; or, what is almoſt as bad, to diſcredit it, by falſe and hypocritic zeal for the corruptions which have crept into it. In a word, had I written with any oblique views, and not from a ſenſe of duty, I ſhould have ſuited the entertainment to the taſte of my ſuperiors. For a man muſt be of a ſtrange complexion indeed, who when he has *conformed to Religion* for his convenience, will ſcruple to go on and reap the benefit of his compliance, by *conforming to the Faſhion.*

So far as to the Author's *cold Friends.* With reſpect to his *warm* ones, They have not plaid their parts ſo well; they ſeem to have given

up

up their Cauſe too ſoon. They might have ſaid with truth, and a full knowledge of the caſe, "That no man was readier than the Author of the *View*, to comply with the temper of the times; and eſpecially with the inclinations of his friends, to whoſe *ſatisfaction* he has been ever ready to ſacrifice his own inclinations; but, to their *ſervices*, every thing, except his duty and his honour; was he capable of doing that, he would not deſerve a virtuous Friend: That probably, he conſidered the matter in queſtion as one of thoſe excepted caſes, where he could hearken to nothing but the dictates of honour, and the duties of his ſtation: that he ſaw *Religion* inſulted, a *moral Governor* defied; *Naturaliſm*, a ſpecies of *Atheiſm*, openly, and with all the arts of ſophiſtry and declamation, inculcated, and the oppoſing World inſolently branded as a cabal

of

of fools, knaves, and madmen:" They might have ſaid, "That where errors of ſmall conſequence are in queſtion, or even great ones, when delivered with modeſty and candour, ſuitable meaſures are to be obſerved. But here the impiety and the inſult were equally in the extreme:" To which, in the laſt place, they might have added moſt of thoſe other conſiderations which have been urged in the courſe of this Apology. And had they been ſo pleaſed, the defence had not only been better made, but with much more dignity and advantage.

However the Author of the *View* has yet the vanity, amidſt all this mortification, to reflect, that there is a very wide difference between *diſpleaſing*, and *the being diſapproved*: and that *this very Public*, who complain by the pen of my anonymous Friend, feel that difference.

The decencies of Acquaintance, habitual impreſſions, and even the moſt innocent partialities, might make them uneaſy to ſee Lord BOLINGBROKE expoſed to contempt; but their love of the Public, their reverence both for its Civil and Religious intereſts, will make them pleaſed to ſee his PRINCIPLES confuted and expoſed. When a noble Roman had in public Senate accuſed one of the greateſt Peſts of his age and country, he obſerved, that the vigour with which he purſued this Enemy of the Republic, made many worthy men uneaſy; but he ſatisfied himſelf with this reflexion, *tantum ad fiduciam vel metum differt, nolint homines facias, an non probent.*

In a word, my duty to God, to my Country, to Mankind at large, had, as I fancied, called upon me to do what I did, and in the *manner* I have done it. If I have offended any

good Man, any friend to my perſon, or my Cauſe, it is a ſacrifice to Duty, which yet I muſt never repent of having made, tho' the diſpleaſure of a friend be the ſevereſt trial of it. I know what that man has to expect both from *Infidelity* and *Bigotry*, who engages WITHOUT RESERVE in the ſervice of Religion. *Benefacere et malè audire* has always been the lot of ſuch Adventurers. But I have long ſince taken my party: "Omnia praecepi, atque animo "mecum ante peregi. Nec recuſo, "ſi ita caſus attulerit, luere poenas "ob honeſtiſſima facta, dum FLA-"GITIOSISSIMA ULCISCOR."

Jan. 4, 1755.

LETTER III.

DEAR SIR,

LET me firſt claim your thanks for ſparing you ſo long on the chapter of Lord Bolingbroke; and then aſk you, what you now think of this paper Meteor, which ſo flames and ſparkles; and, while it kept at diſtance, drew after it the admiring croud; like a Comet, croſſing the celeſtial Orbs, and traverſing, and domineering over the eſtabliſhed Syſtem; in the preſage of ſuperſtitious Divines, denouncing peſtilence and ruin to the World beneath; but in the more philoſophic opinion of his followers, re-creating and reviving the drineſs and ſterility of exhauſted Nature.

Unde hæc MONSTRA tamen, vel quo de fonte, requiris.

Your love of Mankind makes you ſee this new Phænomenon with horror. And you aſk, Is it for this, that ſuch a torrent of abuſe has been poured out upon every private Character, upon every public Order, upon every branch of Learning, upon every Syſtem

of Philoſophy, and upon every Inſtitution of Religion? They were not poured out at hazard, for all theſe things ſtood in his way: they were not poured out in vain, for they are given for *Arguments*; and will, I make no doubt, be ſo received. The wiſe Quintilian, it is true, has obſerved, *Propriam* MODERATIONEM, QUÆDAM CAUSÆ *deſiderant*. And it muſt be confeſſed, that if ever *Moderation*, and temperance of expreſſion, became an author, or was well ſuited to his diſcourſe, it was when the purpoſe of his work, like that of his Lordſhip's, was to overturn all ESTABLISHED RELIGION, founded in the belief of a Sovereign Maſter, ſupremely *juſt* and *good*; and all ESTABLISHED LEARNING, employed for the defence of ſuch Religion: And, on their ruins, to erect NATURALISM, inſtead of real Theiſm, and a FIRST PHILOSOPHY, inſtead of real Science. When, I ſay, a Writer had thought proper to inſult the common ſentiments of Mankind, on points eſteemed ſo eſſential to their well being, common policy, as well as common decency, required, that it ſhould be done by the moſt winning inſinuation and addreſs; and not by calling every man, who would

would not take his ſyſtem upon truſt, MADMAN, KNAVE, FOOL, and BLASPHEMER.

But ſuperior Genius's have been always deemed above the reſtraint of rules. *Tully* obſerves, that ARCESILAS, fitted by a turbulence of temper, to confound the peace, and overturn the eſtabliſhed order of things, had done that miſchief in PHILOSOPHY, which TITUS GRACCHUS had projected in the REPUBLIC [1]. But his Lordſhip, prompted by a nobler ambition, would play both parts in their turns, and ſhine an *Arceſilas* and a *Gracchus* too.

His ill ſucceſs in buſineſs (from which, as he tells us himſelf, he never deſiſted, *while he had hopes of doing any good)* forced him to turn his great talents from POLITICS to PHILOSOPHY. But he had not yet mortified that Ambition which was always prompting him to aſpire to the head of things: and he carried with him that ſufficiency, and thoſe reſentments, which had proved ſo ill ſuited to the Cabinets of Princes, into the Cloſet of the Philoſopher.

We may add, that he entered upon *Let-*

[1] Tum exortus eſt, ut in Optima Rep. Ti. Gracchus qui etiam perturbaret, ſic Arceſilas, qui *conſtitutam* Philoſophiam everteret.

ters in an advanced age; and this ſtill further viciated his natural temper by an acquired infirmity, to which, as Tully obſerves, ſuch late Adventurers are extremely ſubject. ΟΨΙΜΑΘΕΙΣ *autem homines ſcis* QUAM INSOLENTES *ſint*: "You know, "ſays he, how INSOLENT thoſe men ge-"nerally are, who come late to their book."

But now having given you *my* thoughts of his Lordſhip's *aſſuming* temper, it would be unfair not to give you his own; eſpecially as he has been ſo ingenuous to make no ſecret of it. He had kept, it ſeems, ill company; and his *natural candor and modeſty* had been hurt by it. But let him tell his own ſtory: "I grow VERY APT TO "ASSUME, by converſing ſo much with "ECCLESIASTICAL WRITERS, who aſ-"ſume much oftener than they prove [2]."

But whatever cauſes concurred to form this temper, certain it is, that his *contempt of others* was become ſo habitual to him, that it operates where no reaſonable provocation can be aſſigned. I have ſhewn you, in my firſt Letter, at what a rate, his diſguſt to the *Morals*, and his averſion to the *Sanctions*, of the GOSPEL, diſpoſed him to treat all who had

[2] Vol. iv. p. 504.

contributed

contributed to propagate, or to ſupport, *Revelation.* But how the honeſt PAGANS of antiquity had offended, who, many of them, believed no more of a *future ſtate* than himſelf, is a little hard to conceive.

Yet PYTHAGORAS, he tells us, was a turbulent fellow, and a fanatical ſubverter of States.

Nor did PLATO's *delirious brains* [3] ſecure him from becoming, on occaſion, a paultry cheat, and a mercenary flatterer. For almoſt all his *Madmen* are *Knaves* into the bargain. But Plato had made himſelf notorious, by the *blaſphemous* title he had given to the *firſt Cauſe*, of the FIRST GOOD. So that his Lordſhip regarded him as at the head of that wicked Sect, who aſcribe *moral attributes* to the Deity.

Even SOCRATES, whoſe glory it was, as Tully aſſures us, to take PHILOSOPHY out of the clouds, and bring it to dwell amongſt cities and men, *ſubſtituted* (in his Lordſhip's opinion) *fantaſtic, for real knowledge* [4]—*and entertained and propagated* THEOLOGICAL *and* METAPHYSICAL *notions, which are not, moſt certainly, parts of* NATURAL THEOLOGY [5]. We under-

[3] Vol. iv. p. 88. [4] Vol. iv. p. 112. [5] Vol. iv. p. 122.

ſtand his Lordſhip very well. He means a *particular* Providence and a *future* ſtate: the *moral* attributes of the Deity, and the *ſubſtantiality* of the Soul. This apparently was *the fantaſtic knowledge which makes no part of natural theology.*

When theſe pagan Heroes fare no better, who would be concerned for Church-men? or much diſturbed to hear CYPRIAN called a *Liar and a Madman* [6]; JEROM, a *ſurly, foul-mouthed Bully*; and EPIPHANIUS, *an Idiot?*

But now comes on a difficulty indeed.—PAUL and PLATO bear their crimes in their countenance. The *Goſpel of Peace*, he tells us, produced nothing but *Murders*; and the idea of a *firſt Good* was the occaſion of all *evil.* But what had SCIPIO and REGULUS done, to be caſhiered of their Dignities? They were neither *artificial Theologers*, nor yet *mad Metaphyſicians*; but plain, ſober Stateſmen. His Lordſhip's quarrel, we know, is with DIVINITY in all its forms; but he profeſſes to admire the *moral Virtues.* And if there are any of higher eclat than the reſt, and in which his Lordſhip would be more particularly ambitious to ſhine, they muſt needs be CHASTITY and GOOD FAITH,

[6] Vol. iv. p. 407.

Cui

CUI, *Pudor*, et Juſtitiæ ſoror
Incorrupta Fides, &c. &c.

Yet he wreſts all his reading to deprive thoſe two brave Romans of their high reputation, when they had ſo fairly earned it by the ſevereſt trials. I am not ignorant of that childiſh infirmity of our nature, a fondneſs for ingroſſing to ourſelves thoſe ſhining qualities with which we may happen to be dazzled; but I can hardly ſuſpect his Lordſhip of ſo ſelfiſh and infantine a project; much leſs would I ſuppoſe him capable of thinking, that SCIPIO and REGULUS may be ſtill thoſe very great men, they have been taken for, though ſtained quite through with *luſt* and *perfidy*.

It is true, indeed, the new Hiſtorian of Great Britain, another of theſe *firſt philoſophy-men* (for the eſſence of the Sect conſiſting in paradox, it ſhines as well in *Hiſtory* as *Divinity)* he, I ſay, tells us, that it will admit of a reaſonable doubt, whether *ſeverity of manners alone, and abſtinence from pleaſure, can deſerve the name of Virtue* [1].

[1] *The Hiſtory of Great Britain*, Vol. i. p. 200 4to. printed at Edinb. 1754.

But then he is as ſingular in his notions of *Religion.* He holds but two ſpecies of it in all nature, *Superſtition* and *Fanaticiſm*; and under one or other of them, he gives you to underſtand [7], the whole of *Chriſtian profeſſion* is, and ever was, included. On the Church *of England*, indeed, he is ſo indulgent, to beſtow *all* Religion has to give. For when he ſets it againſt *Popery* it is *Fanaticiſm*: but as often as it faces about, and is oppoſed to *Puritaniſm*, it then becomes *Superſtition*; and this as conſtantly as the occaſions return.

You will ſay I grow partial to his Lordſhip, in appearing ſo anxious for his reputation, while your two favorite characters expire under his pen.

Never fear it. They have not lived ſo long to die of a fright. When his Lordſhip bluſters we know how to take him down. It is only leading him back to that *Antiquity* he has been abuſing.

Half the work is done to my hands; and I ſhall have only the trouble of tranſcribing the defence of *Scipio* againſt his Lordſhip's ſuſpicions, as I find it in an expoſtulatory letter to him, on his recent treatment of a deceaſed friend.——

[7] See his Hiſtory throughout.

" *The reputation of the first Scipio* (says " his Lordship) *was not so clear and uncon-* " *troverted in* PRIVATE, *as in public life*; " *nor was he allowed by all to be a man of* " *such severe virtue as he affected, and as* " *that age required. Nævius was thought* " *to mean him, in some verses Gellius has* " *preserved*; *and* VALERIUS ANTIAS *made* " *no scruple to assert, that far from restoring* " *the fair Spaniard to her family, he debauch-* " *ed and kept her.* P. 204, of the *Idea of a* " *Patriot King*. One would have hoped so " mean a slander might have slept forgot- " ten in the dirty corner of a poor Pe- " dant's [8] common place. And yet we " see it quoted as a fact by an Instructor of " Kings. Who knows but at some happy " time or other, when a writer wants to " prove, that *real friendship* becomes a " great man as little as *real chastity* [9], " this *advertisement* [10] of yours may be " advanced to the same dignity of credit " with the calumny of *Valerius Antias*. If " it should, I would not undertake to dis- " pute the fact on which such an infer- " ence might be made; for, I remember,

[8] A. Gellius. [9] See p. 201, of the *Patriot King*. [10] Advertisement concerning Mr. Pope, prefixed to the *Patriot King*.

" Tully,

" Tully, a great Stateſman himſelf, long
" ago obſerved, *Veræ amicitiæ difficilli-*
" *me reperiuntur in iis, qui in republica*
" *verſantur.* — But the words of Nævius
" were theſe,

" *Etiam qui res magnas manu ſæpe geſſit*
" *glorioſe,*
" *Cujus facta viva nunc vigent; qui apud*
" *gentes ſolus*
" *Præſtat: eum ſuus pater cum pallio uno*
" *ab amica abduxit.*

" Theſe obſcure verſes were, in *Gellius's*
" opinion, the ſole foundation of Antias's
" calumny, againſt the univerſal concur-
" rence of Hiſtorians. *His ego verſibus*
" *credo adductum Valerium Antiatem* AD-
" VERSUM CETEROS OMNES *ſcriptores de*
" SCIPIONIS *moribus ſenſiſſe.* L. vi. c. 8.
" And what he thought of this hiſtorian's
" modeſty and truth, we may collect from
" what he ſays of him in another place.
" Where having quoted two tribunitial de-
" crees, which, he tells us, he tranſcribed
" from Records [*ex annaliium monumentis*]
" he adds, that *Valerius Antias* made no
" ſcruple to give them the lye in public.
" *Valerius autem Antias, contra hanc decre-*

" *torum memoriam contraque auctoritates*
" *veterum annalium—dixit*, &c. L. vii. c.
" 19. And Livy, in his xxxvi^th book,
" quoting this *Antias*, for the particulars
" of a victory, ſubjoins, concerning the num-
" ber ſlain, *Scriptori parum fidei ſit, quia*
" *in augendo non alius intemperantior eſt.*
" And he who will amplify on one occaſion
" will diminiſh on another; for it is the
" ſame intemperate paſſion that carries him
" indifferently to each extreme [1]."

REGULUS's virtue comes next under his Lordſhip's cenſure: " I know not (ſays he)
" whether Balbus would have called in que-
" ſtion the STORY OF REGULUS. Vid. *Au.*
" *Gellium.* It was probably fabulous, in
" many circumſtances at leaſt, and there
" were thoſe amongſt the Romans who
" thought it to be ſo [2]." Would not any one now imagine, by his bringing *Au. Gellius* again upon the ſtage, that there was another *Valerius Antias* in reſerve, to depoſe againſt REGULUS likewiſe? juſt the contrary. The Grammarian, in the iv^th chapter of his 6th book, confirms the common ſtory, with an addition, by the teſtimo-

[1] *A Letter to the Editor of the Letters on the Spirit of Patriotiſm, the idea of a Patriot King, and the ſtate of Parties*, &c. [2] Vol. v. p. 406.

nies

nies of the Hiſtorians *Tubero* and *Tuditanus*. The truth however is, that his Lordſhip had his Voucher, though he be ſo ſhy of producing him. It is the reſpectable Mr. TOLAND; to whom his Lordſhip is much indebted for this, as well as better things. Amongſt the poſthumous tracts of that virtuous writer, there is a *Diſſertation*, intitled, *The fabulous death of Atilius Regulus*: in which, from a fragment of *Diodorus Siculus*, preſerved by *Conſtantinus Porphyrogenitus*, he endeavours to prove, againſt all the Roman writers, with *Cicero* at their head, that *Regulus* did not die in torments, but of mere chagrin. Toland only denied that his virtue was put to ſo ſevere a trial; but this was enough for his Lordſhip, to call in queſtion the whole ſtory; and to add, that *there were thoſe amongſt the* ROMANS *who thought it to be fabulous.* Unluckily, the *Roman* writers are unanimous for the truth of the ſtory. How then ſhall we account for his Lordſhip's aſſertion? Did he take Diodorus Siculus for a Latin writer, becauſe he had not ſeen him in Greek? Or did he underſtand A. Gellius as quoting *Tubero* and *Tuditanus* for doubters of the common ſtory?

His

His Lordſhip's ambition was uniform and ſimple: it was only, as we ſaid, TO BE AT THE HEAD OF THINGS. As he comes nearer home, therefore, he is more and more alarmed. He found his place already occupied by certain Counterfeits and Pretenders, who had, ſome how or other, got into the throne of Science, and had actually received homage from the literary world. But he unmaſks and depoſes them with as much eaſe as contempt.

"SELDEN, GROTIUS, PUFFENDORF, and "CUMBERLAND (ſays his Lordſhip) ſeem "to be great writers, by much the ſame "right as he might be called a great "traveller, who ſhould go from London to "Paris by the *Cape of Good Hope* [3]." I can hardly think they took ſo large a compaſs. But let us truſt to the Proverb: They and his Lordſhip, never fear, will prove it between them, *that the fartheſt way about is the neareſt way home.* He ſhews us a ready road indeed, but it leads to *Atheiſm*; whereas, if they take us a little about, they bring us ſafely home to *Religion.*

[3] Vol. v. p. 68.

He

He profeſſes "a thorough contempt for "the whole buſineſs of the learned lives of "SCALIGER, BOCHART, PETAVIUS, USH-"ER, and MARSHAM [4]." His contempt is well grounded: for having put himſelf to ſchool to them, and learned nothing, it was natural for him to think, there was nothing to be learnt. One may ſurely be allowed to ſay, *he learnt nothing*, when we find him ignorant even of the firſt elements of the ſcience, the meaning of THE YEAR OF NABONASSAR; which being only an *Æra* to reckon from, he miſtook for a periodical revolution of an *artificial Year* [5].

But what need we more? Thoſe to whom he is moſt indebted; whom he moſt approves, and whom he honours with the title of *Maſter*, all ſhare in one common compliment, of inſufficiency and abſurdity.

MARCILIUS FICINUS, he calls the *beſt Interpreter of Plato*; but, at the ſame time aſſures us, he was *perfectly delirious*. But why, you aſk, is *Ficinus the beſt Interpreter*

[4] Vol. ii. p. 261—2.

[5] —"Beroſus pretended to give the Hiſtory [of "the Babylonians] of four hundred eighty years:— "and if it was ſo, THESE YEARS WERE PROBABLY "THE YEARS OF NABONASSAR." Vol. ii.

of

of Plato, ſince *J. Scaliger*, who knew ſomething of the matter, ſays, that *he ſtript his Maſter of his purple, and put him on his own beggarly rags?* For a good reaſon; *Ficinus* taught his Lordſhip all he knew of Platoniſm. But why is he then *perfectly delirious?* For a better ſtill: he holds opinions which his Lordſhip condemns.

His favorite BARROW, he tells us, "goes "on, a long while, begging the queſtion, "and talking in a theological cant MORE "WORTHY OF PAUL than of a man like "him [6]—flimzy ſtuff, which a man is "obliged to vend, when he puts on a black "gown and band [7]."

LOCKE and NEWTON, he inſinuates, were his Heroes: Nay, ſuch is his condeſcenſion, that he profeſſes himſelf the pupil of the former. Yet this does not ſecure Locke from being mighty liable to a PHILOSOPHICAL DELIRIUM [8]. And as for NEWTON, the APPLICATION *of his Philoſophy is grown, or growing into ſome abuſe* [9]. Would you know how? By affording CLARKE and BAXTER certain principles

[6] Vol. iv. p. 278. [7] Vol. v. p. 361. [8] Vol. iii. p. 442. [9] Vol. iii. p. 374.

whereby

whereby to demonſtrate, *that the Soul is an immaterial ſubſtance.* An *abuſe* indeed!

But BACON and LOCKE, *as much as he admires them, he is not blind* (he ſays) *to their errors; but can, without being dazzled, diſcern* SPOTS IN THESE SUNS.—

Before I go any further, I will lay you a wager I know what thoſe ſpots are. They are, or I am much miſtaken, no other than the ſtains of *Faith* and the impurities of *Revelation.* But let us hear him.—" I can diſ-
" cern a tincture, and ſometimes more than
" a tincture, in BACON, of thoſe falſe notions,
" which we are APT TO IMBIBE as MEN, as
" INDIVIDUALS, as MEMBERS OF SOCIETY,
" and as SCHOLARS. I can diſcern in LOCKE
" ſometimes ill-abſtracted and ill-determin-
" ed ideas, from which a wrong application
" of words proceeds; and propoſitions to
" which I can, by no means, aſſent. I con-
" feſs further, that I have been, and ſtill
" am at a loſs, to find any appearance of
" CONSISTENCY in an author, who pub-
" liſhed a COMMENTARY ON THE EPI-
" STLES OF ST. PAUL, and a treatiſe on
" the REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANI-
" TY (which he endeavours to prove by
" fact and by argument) AFTER having
" ſtated

" ſtated clearly as he has done, the con-
" ditions and meaſures of hiſtorical pro-
" bability; AND AFTER having written
" as ſtrongly as he has done againſt the
" abuſe of Words [1]." Did not I tell you ſo!

——" This SUN's ſick too:
" Shortly he'll be an EARTH:

as the Poet has it, in his deſcription of the peſtilence at Thebes; not more fatal to great Cities than this bloated Vapour of a *firſt Philoſophy*, which mimics, and, as he reflects, defiles that SUN of Science, and turns Nature into Prodigy.

Et SOLEM geminum et duplices ſe oſtendere THEBAS, &c.

But his Lordſhip's account of his other *Luminary*, BACON, is ſtill more extraordinary — He *thinks he diſcerns in him a tincture, and more than a tincture of thoſe falſe notions, which we are apt to imbibe as* MEN, *as* INDIVIDUALS, *as* MEMBERS OF SOCIETY, *and as* SCHOLARS. — That is, as *Men*, we are apt to think we have a SOUL;

[1] Vol. iv. p. 166.

as *Individuals*, we are in expectation of a FUTURE STATE; as *Members of Society*, we are inclined to reverence the ESTABLISHED RELIGION; and as *Scholars*, we are taught to *reaſon*, and not to HARANGUE. If any of his Lordſhip's Followers can give a better account of this ſtrange paſſage, I am very ready to reſign the office I have here aſſumed, of being for once his Commentator.

In truth, his Lordſhip deals by RELIGION, and it's Advocates, as a certain french Author, I have red, does by ALCHEMY and the hermetic Philoſophers; he brings almoſt every great name into the number; and after having entertained his reader much at their expence, concludes each various eulogy, alike, —— "Now his folly was in hoping to extract "*Gold* from *baſer metals*:" as the folly of all his Lordſhip's *Alchemiſts* is the hope of bettering *human nature* by GRACE.

You now, Sir, underſtand, how well the diſpoſition of his mind and temper was fitted to his Syſtem. They ſeem indeed to be tallies, and act mutually upon one, another,

another, as cauſe and effect, in their turns.

It often happens, that men who arraign Religion, have been firſt arraigned by it; and their defiance of *Truth* is only a repriſal upon *Conſcience*. Under theſe circumſtances it is no wonder they ſhould go to work much out of humour; tho 'it be in an affair which requires a perfect calmneſs of mind, and freedom from all perturbation. But his Lordſhip has the miſerable advantage of being the firſt who has written under one intermitting fit of rage and reſentment. In this ſtate, like a man in a fever, whom no poſture can eaſe, whom no ſituation can accommodate, he is angry at PHILOSOPHERS for explaining what they cannot comprehend; he is angry at DIVINES for believing without explaining. Well then, they change hands; the *Philoſopher* believes, and the *Divine* explains. No matter. He is angry ſtill. In this temper then we leave him, and turn to the proper ſubject of my Letter.

You would know, you ſay, with what abilities he ſupports his Syſtem.

The attacks upon Religion have always been carried on, like war, by *Stratagem* and *Force*. I ſhall firſt therefore ſpeak of his *Arts*, and then of his *Powers* of controverſy.

It has been obſerved how cloſely, and how humbly, he copies the FREE-THINKERS who went before him; even to the ſtaleſt of their worn-out ſtratagems.

When FREE-THINKING firſt went upon it's miſſion, the PUBLIC were not diſpoſed to underſtand raillery on a ſubject of this importance: ſo that it is poſſible there might be found amongſt the more early of our anti-Apoſtles, a Confeſſor or two to the glorious cauſe of Infidelity. This put their Succeſſors on their guard; or, what was better, gave them a pretence to *affect* it. From henceforth you hardly ſee an Infidel-book which is not introduced with the obligations, the Reader has to theſe ſervants of Truth, for venturing ſo far in his ſervice, while the Secular arm hovers fearfully over them; With the diſadvantages their cauſe muſt lye under, while it can be but half explained and half ſupported; and with the wonders they

have in reserve, which only keep back and wait for a little more *Christian Liberty*.

This miserable Crambe made so constant a part of our diet, and had been dished up from time to time with so little variety, that it grew both offensive and ridiculous; for what could be more nauseous than to feign an apprehension of the Magistrate's resentment, after they had writ at their ease for almost a century together, with the most uncontrolled and unbridled licence?

In this state of things could you easily believe his Lordship would pride himself in cooking up this cold kitchen-stuff, and serving it again and again, in the midst of so elegant an entertainment. "GASSENDI "(says he) apprehended enemies much "more formidable than mere Philoso- "phers, because armed with ecclesiastical "and civil power. It is this fear which "has hindered those who have combated "ERROR in all ages; and WHO COMBAT "IT STILL, from taking all the ADVAN- "TAGES which a FULL EXPOSITION OF "THE TRUTH would give them. Their "adversaries triumph as if the goodness of "their cause had given them the Victory,

" when nothing has prevented their EN-
" TIRE DEFEAT, or reduced their con-
" teſt to a drawn battle, except this, that
" they have employed arms of every kind,
" fair and foul, without any reſerve;
" while the others have employed their
" offenſive weapons with MUCH RESERVE;
" and have even BLUNTED THEIR EDGE
" when they uſed them [2]."

" The adverſaries [of Religion] (ſays
" he again) ſeldom ſpeak out, or puſh
" the inſtances and arguments they bring,
" ſo far as THEY MIGHT BE CARRIED. In-
" ſtead of which theſe ORTHODOX BUL-
" LIES affect to triumph over men who
" employ but PART OF THEIR STRENGTH,
" &c. [3]."

And having, after his Maſters, thus *feigned* a fear, he *feigns* all the precaution of doubling and obliquity, which fear produces. He profeſſes to believe the Miſſion of Chriſt, tho' founded on the diſpenſation of Moſes, a diſpenſation he ridicules and execrates: He profeſſes to believe the doctrines of Chriſt, tho' he rejects his gift of life and immortality; He profeſſes to believe him the Saviour of the

[2] Vol. iv. p. 163. [3] Vol. iii. p. 273.

World,

World, tho' he laughs at the doctrine of Redemption which conſtitutes the eſſence of that character.

Well fare the New *Hiſtorian of Great Britain*; who having writ without control againſt Miracles, and even the very Being of a God, gratefully acknowledges the bleſſing; and owns that *We now enjoy* TO THE FULL *that liberty of the Preſs which is ſo* NECESSARY *in every monarchy confined by legal limitations* [4]. It is excellently obſerved too, let me tell you, that tho' the *Monarch* ſhould be *confined by legal limitations*, yet the *writer for the Preſs* ſhould not.

It would be endleſs to enter into his Lordſhip's ſmall arts of controverſy; yet it may not be amiſs to touch upon one or two of them; ſuch I mean as are of more general uſe and the readieſt ſervice.

The firſt is, *To honour the name when you have taken away the thing*: As thus, To expreſs the higheſt devotion to *God*, when you have deprived him of his *moral attributes*:—the greateſt zeal for *Religion*, while you are undermining a *future ſtate*;—and the utmoſt reverence for *Revelation*, when you have ſtript it of *miracles and propheſies*.

[4] *The Hiſtory of Great Britain*, Vol. i. p. 213.

2. A *ſecond* is, *To diſhonour Perſons and Opinions, the moſt reſpectable, by putting them into ill company, or by joining them with diſcredited follies.* Thus, Divines and Atheiſts; Clarkians and Malebranchians, are well paired, and always ſhewn together: In like manner, The propoſitions, *that the world was made for man*, and *that man was made for happineſs*, are to be boldly repreſented as two inſeparable parts of the ſame ſyſtem. From whence, theſe advantages follow, that if an *Atheiſt* be odious, a *Malebranchian* mad, and the propoſition of the *World's being made for man*, abſurd; the odium, the madneſs, and the abſurdity fall equally on the *Divines*, on Dr. *Clarke*, and on the propoſition, that *man was made for happineſs*.

3. A *third* is, *To bring the abuſe of a thing in diſcredit of the thing itſelf.* Thus the viſions of the *Rabbins* are made to confute JUDAISM; *Popery* and *School-learning*, to decry the *diſcipline and doctrine of* CHRISTIANITY; and the dreams of *Malebranche*, *Leibnitz*, and *Berkeley*, to confute the waking thoughts of CUDWORRH, CLARKE, WOLLASTON, and BAXTER: For his Lordſhip is juſt ſuch aconfuter of *Metapyſics*, as he would

would be of *Ethics* or *Chemiſtry*, who ſhould content himſelf with expoſing the abſurdities of the *Stoics*, and the whimſies of the *Alchemiſts*, and yet fraudulently forget that there are ſuch Authors, as CICERO and BOERHAAVE.—To overturn a FUTURE STATE, he employs all the ſuperſtitious fables of the Poets and the People, concerning it: To diſcredit REVELATION, he enumerates all the Impoſtors, and Pretenders to *revelation* in all ages: And to diſhonour DIVINE WORSHIP, he is very particular in deſcribing the rites and ceremonies of the antient Church of Egypt, and the modern Church of Rome. In a word, you are ſure to find, on theſe occaſions, every ſort of topic, but what the ſober and intelligent Reader requires; *Conſiderations drawn from the nature of the thing itſelf.*

You would expect, however, that, when the ABUSES of things have done him ſuch ſervice as to ſtand, where he has placed them, for the *things themſelves*, he would for once, at leaſt, ſpare the AUTHORS of the *abuſe*, if it were only for the ſake of carrying on his fraud. If you expect ſo much, you are miſtaken in his Lordſhip. He can, in the ſame breath, call

the *abuſes* of Revelation and the Goſpel, by the names of *Revelation and the Goſpel*, and rail at the *Clergy* or at the *Divine* who has introduced thoſe abuſes.

4. Another of theſe ſmall arts, (and with this I ſhall conclude my account of them) is *the covering his own ſuperficial knowledge (and oftentimes his thefts) with calling thoſe who pretend to more, vain ſupercilious pedants.* Thus having largely pillaged a modern Writer, in his account of the Pagan MYSTERIES, he ſubjoins, "To attempt a minute and circumſtantial "account of theſe *Myſteries*, and even to "ſeem to give it, would require *much* "*greater knowledge of Antiquity than I* "*pretend to have, or would take the trou-*"*ble of acquiring*. They who attempt it "have been, and always will be, ridicu-"louſly and vainly employed, while they "treat this ſubject as if they had aſſiſted "at the celebration of theſe Myſteries, or "had at leaſt been drivers of the Aſs who "carried the MACHINES and IMPLE-"MENTS that ſerved in the celebration of "them[5]."

It doubtleſs became him well, to talk

[5] Vol. iv. p. 58.

magiſterially on a ſubject of which he underſtood nothing but what he learnt from the Author, he abuſes. How-ever, he is nearer the truth than uſual, when he ſays, *that the author* is as *particular, as if he had been at the unloading of the Aſs*, &c. for though he was not at that ceremony, yet he had his accounts from thoſe who were.—But jeſting is dangerous on learned ſubjects, and in a ſecond-hand wit, when he ventures to employ the ideas of Antiquity. He talks of *this Aſs* as carrying the MACHINES and IMPLEMENTS, for the celebration of Myſteries; *machines* which were for the entertainment of fifty or ſixty thouſand people, at a time, in a great variety of repreſentations. The common Latin proverb might have taught him, that what the *Aſs* carried were the Books of the Myſteries; which if only as bulky as thoſe of the *firſt Philoſophy*, were load enough in conſcience for any ſingle *Aſs*.---But I agree with his Lordſhip, it is not eaſy to ſpeak of theſe *Myſteries* without verifying the Proverb [6].

Thus far for a ſpecimen of his Lordſhip's *arts of controverſy*. But as a good

[6] *Aſinus portat myſteria.*

Mimic

Mimic is commonly a bad *Actor*; and a good *Juggler* a bad *Mechanic*, ſo an artful *Caviller* is as generally a very poor *Reaſoner*.

You will not be ſurprized therefore, if, in examining his Lordſhip's *Philoſophic Character*, under the ſeveral heads of his INGENUITY, his TRUTH, his CONSISTENCY, his LEARNING, and his REASONING, we find him not to make ſo good a figure, as in the *profeſſed arts* of Controverſy.

I. Of his INGENUITY, which comes firſt, I ſhall content myſelf with only one or two inſtances; for his *arts of controverſy*, of which you have had a taſte, are a continued example of it.

1. Speaking of the Chriſtians of the Apoſtolic age, he thus repreſents their character and manners. "Notwithſtanding "the ſanctity of their *profeſſion*, the "GREATEST CRIMES, even that of IN-"CEST, were practiſed amongſt them [7]."

Is it poſſible (you aſk) that his Lordſhip ſhould give credit to the explod-ed calumnies of their Pagan adverſaries? Think better of his ſenſe and candour: he alludes to no ſuch matter. St. PAUL is his Authority; and he quotes chapter

[7] Vol. iv. p. 513.

and

and verſe, to ſupport his charge. This but increaſes your ſurprize. It is very likely: for Philoſophers, as well as Poets, of a certain rank, aim at nothing but (as *Bays* expreſſes it) to *elevate and ſurprize*. Who would not conclude, from this repreſentation, that the firſt Chriſtians began their profeſſion in a total corruption of manners; and that, like the Magi of old, it was a law amongſt them to marry their Mothers and Daughters. Whereas the ſimple fact, as St. Paul ſtates it, in his firſt and ſecond Epiſtles to the Corinthians, was this, A certain man had married his Father's wife; (but whether before or after his converſion, the writer ſays not) and on the Apoſtle's reprehenſion, convinced and aſhamed of his folly, he repented, and made ſatisfaction for the ſcandal, he had occaſioned.

2. Again, theſe wonderful ESSAYS tell us, that when JESUS ſpeaks of *legions of Angels*, it is the language of PAGANISM; but when Lord BOLINGBROKE ſpeaks of *numberleſs created intelligencies ſuperior to man*, it is the language of NATURE: for, this, his Lordſhip aſſures us, *is founded on what we know of actual exiſtence. We are led to it*

it by plain, direct, unforced ANALOGY. But that of Jesus *stands on no other foundation, philosophically speaking, than of a* MERE POSSIBLE *existence of such spirits, as are admitted for divers* THEOLOGICAL USES. [8] But why these different measures, the one for himself, and the other for his friends, the Divines? His last words let us into the secret. His philosophical *intelligencies* are a very harmless race; but the Christian *Legions* are much given to *theological* mischief. *Ministring Angels* bring in, what he can by no means relish, a particular, and a moral providence. — God's *physical* Providence, and the *civil* providence of the Magistrate, make the only Government he acknowledges: Now his *Intelligencies*, like Epicurus's Gods, are always at an idle end; but *Angels* are too busy and meddling, to be trusted, under his Lordship's Philosophic Administration.

You cannot however but be pleased to find, that the method of reasoning by *Analogy*, which you had cause to think his Lordship had totally discarded, from the hard language he has so often bestowed upon it, is brought again into favour; and now does wonders.

[8] Vol. iv. p. 179.

3. It not only opens the door, as we ſee, to his Lordſhip's *Intelligencies*, by a *plain, direct, and unforced*, application, but it ſhuts it againſt *Jeſus Chriſt's*. "I only intend to "ſhew (ſays he) that ſince men have not "admitted, in favour of Revelation, a "Syſtem of PHYSICS that is inconſiſtent "with philoſophic truth, there is no rea-"ſon for admitting, in favour of the ſame "revelation, a Syſtem of PNEUMATICS "that is ſo, too [9]."

The favourers of Revelation would own the inference, had his Lordſhip, in ſtating the caſe, not begged the queſtion. As it is, they ſay, his reaſoning, when fairly repreſented, ſtands thus—"Divines reject "the Scripture Syſtem of PHYSICS, which "THEY hold to be falſe, therefore, they "ſhould reject the Scripture-Syſtem of "PNEUMATICS," which HIS LORDSHIP holds to be falſe. Indeed, they conceive this no better an argument than if you was to ſay, That becauſe Politicians, in ſpeaking of the firſt ſource of political power, have called it the *primum mobile*, (alluding to the old erroneous Syſtem of Aſtronomy) and becauſe they have talked too of a *ba-*

[9] Vol. iv. p. 181.

lance

lance of Power, (alluding to the true principles of Mechanics) therefore, if we reject their Syſtem of *Aſtronomy*, we ſhould reject their Syſtem of *Mechanics*, likewiſe.

II. Give me leave, Sir, to lead you next and bring you to a place where you may have an advantageous view of this noble Philoſopher's TRUTH, the very Soul of Philoſophy.

1. "The Chriſtian Theology (ſays he) "has derived a prophane licence from the "Jewiſh, which Divines have rendered ſo "familiar and ſo habitual, that Men BLAS-"PHEME without knowing they blaſpheme, "and that their very devotion is IMPIOUS. "The licence I mean is that of reaſoning "and of ſpeaking of the divine, as of the "human, nature, operations, and proceed-"ings; ſometimes with, and ſometimes "without the ſalvo of thoſe diſtinguiſhing "epithets and forms of ſpeech, which "can, in very few inſtances, diſtinguiſh e-"nough. The Jewiſh Scriptures aſcribe "to God, not only corporeal appearance, "but corporeal action, and all the inſtru-"ments of it; eyes to ſee, ears to hear, "mouth and tongue to articulate, hands "to handle, and feet to walk. DIVINES

"TELL

" TELL US INDEED that we are not to " underſtand all this according to the *lite-* " *ral* ſignification. The meaning is, they " ſay, that God has a power to execute " all thoſe acts, to the effecting of which, " theſe parts, in us, are inſtrumental. The " literal ſignification is, indeed, abomina- " ble, and the FLIMSY ANALOGICAL " VEIL, thrown over it, is ſtolen from " the wardrobe of EPICURUS; for he " taught, that the Gods had not literally " bodies, but ſomething like to bodies, " *quaſi corpus:* not blood, but ſomething " like to blood, *quaſi ſanguinem* [10]."

DIVINES ſay, that *God has no body nor any thing like to body, but is* IMMATERIAL. EPICURUS ſays, that his *God had not a groſs earthly body, but ſomething like to that body, and was* MATERIAL. Yet " their flimſy *analogical* veil is ſtolen from " the wardrobe of *Epicurus.*" Truly a very ſubtle theft, which extracts MATTER from *figurative expreſſion!* and well ſuited to his Lordſhip's leger-de-main, which draws an *analogical veil* out of a *metaphor*. Indeed, to fit it the better to *Epicurus's wardrobe,* he makes it but a *flimſy* one.

[10] Vol. v. p. 519.

But, let us now ſee, the various ſhifts he has been reduced to, in order to ſupport his principal calumny, that *Divines ſtole from Epicurus the method of explaining the nature of the Godhead.*

He ſays, when the *Jewiſh Scriptures* had given GOD a *Body*, the *Divines* found out that it was not to be underſtood *literally*. Whereas the truth is, that the Jewiſh Scriptures themſelves declare GOD to be a SPIRIT, or *immaterial*, in contradiſtinction to *body* or MATTER. And the beſt of it is, that in other places, (as we have ſeen juſt before) his Lordſhip quarrels with the Scriptures on this very account, for their Syſtem of PNEUMATICS. Now what did the *Divines* deduce from thence, but This neceſſary truth, that where the *Jewiſh Scriptures* deſcribe God's actions, in accommodation to the groſs conceptions of men, it is to be underſtood as a mere *figure of ſpeech*. But this would not ſerve his Lordſhip's purpoſe; which was, to convict the Divines of nonſenſe and prevarication.

He, therefore, turns, what the Divines called METAPHOR which is a figure of ſpeech, into ANALOGY which is a mode of

of reaſoning, *a flimſy analogical veil*: and Epicurus's ANALOGY, that the Gods had not earthly bodies but ſomething like them, that is to ſay, *material*, he turns into a METAPHOR. *Epicurus* (ſays he) *taught that the Gods had not* LITERALLY *bodies*. Epicurus's queſtion was not about literal or figurative expreſſion; but about ſimilar and diſſimilar things.--- But You have enough, You ſay, of this great Reſtorer of TRUTH, and Reformer of REASON. Others may not be ſo eaſily ſatisfied. However I will be as ſhort, on this head, as poſſible.

3. THE JEWS (his Lordſhip tells us) SUPPOSED CRUELTY TO BE ONE OF THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY [10]. —Theſe very JEWS themſelves ſay, That *the Lord is gracious and full of compaſſion; ſlow to anger and of great mercy*: That *he is good to all; and his tender mercies are over* ALL HIS WORKS [1]: That *his mercy endureth for* EVER [2]: That *the* EARTH *is full of the goodneſs and mercy of the Lord* [3]: That *his mercy is from* EVERLASTING TO EVER-

[10] Vol. v. p. 507. [1] Pſ. cxlv. ver. 8, 9. [2] Chron. Jer. Eſra, Pſalms, &c. [3] Pſ. xxxiii. ver. 5. cxix. ver. 64.

LASTING [4]. Now, which of them will You believe?

4. "Superſtition (ſays his Lordſhip) im-
" perſonated *chance* under the name of
" *Fortune*: and this chymerical Divini-
" ty was ſuppoſed to direct arbitrarily
" all the events, whoſe cauſes were
" not apparent, or which exceeded in
" good or ill, the expectations of men.
" The HEATHENS accounted, by it, for
" paſt events; conſulted it about future;
" and referred themſelves to it in doubt-
" ful caſes. It is ſtrange that SUCH SU-
" PERSTITIONS, inſtead of being confined
" to the Heathen world, ſhould have been
" AS PREVALENT amongſt God's choſen
" People, both Jews and Chriſtians; and
" ſhould be ſcarce exploded at this hour.
" It is ſtranger ſtill, that a RECOURSE TO
" THE DECISION OF CHANCE ſhould be
" expreſsly commanded in the *Old Teſta-*
" *ment*, and occaſionally countenanced in
" the *New*, even on ſo important an occa-
" ſion as the election of an Apoſtle in the
" place of Judas Iſcariot [5]."

[4] Pſ. c. ver. 5.—ciii. ver. 17.
[5] Vol. iii. p. 476.

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He asserts, we see, 1. that the *Jews* and *Christians*, as well as the *Heathens*, impersonated *Chance* under the name of *Fortune*: and 2dly, that their having recourse to Lots was having recourse to the decision of *Fortune*.

As to the *first* assertion, it is so remote from all truth, that the custom of the Jewish People, in referring all events to *God* and to him only and immediately, has given a handle to Spinoza, Toland, and others, to bring in question the very existence of an *extraordinary* dispensation.

As to the *second*, we must observe that LOTS are to be considered in three different lights: or, more properly, they are of three distinct kinds.

One sort is a civil balloting, of general use in States to prevent intrigues and partialities. SORTEM *posuissent*, says Tacitus, *ne ambitioni aut inimicitiis locus foret.*

Another, is a superstitious appeal to the imaginary Deity, *Chance* or *Fortune.*

And there is yet another, which is a reference of the event to Heaven, by God's own direction and appointment.

Of the *ſecond*, and only reprehenſible ſort, Revelation, as we have juſt now ſhewn, is entirely innocent.

Of the firſt, his Lordſhip, as a Politician, will not diſallow the uſe: His quarrel, as a Philoſopher, is with the *third*. And he has no way to ſupport his charge, but by ſophiſtically reducing it into the *ſecond*; that is, repreſenting it as having all the ſuperſtition of the *ſecond*. Now in this he begs the queſtion.——Are the Jewiſh and Chriſtian Revelations true or commentitious? Commentitious, ſays his Lordſhip, for ſeveral reaſons; and, amongſt the reſt, for their authorizing the *Pagan ſuperſtition* of LOTS.—What made the Pagan ſuperſtition of Lots? Their being the inventions of men, while they pretended to be of divine appointment.—Very well: but the Jewiſh and Chriſtian Lots were of divine appointment. *Pretended* to be ſo, if you pleaſe, ſays his Lordſhip, and this puts them into the condition of *Pagan lots*.—Softly, my Lord; Your argument muſt not take that for *granted*, which your argument is employed to *prove*.

But his Lordſhip had his head full of that Maſter Sophiſm of the FIRST PHILO-

SOPHY

SOPHY, which concludes againſt the reaſon or juſtice of a DIVINE COMMISSION, becauſe ſubſequent Impoſtors expoſed it to abuſe by pretending to the like command.

For, according to the Logic and Theology of theſe Gentlemen, GOD muſt not caſt out DEVILS, becauſe it afterwards gave a handle for Popiſh Prieſts to juggle with their *Exorciſms*. He muſt not direct a thing to be decided by LOTS, becauſe a village-conjurer would afterwards employ the *ſieve and ſhears*. He muſt not make uſe of HUMAN INSTRUMENTS in puniſhing a people, abandoned to unnatural crimes, becauſe an *Arabian Impoſtor* would afterwards pretend to the like commiſſion. He muſt not inſtitute a multifarious RITUAL, tho' it was to keep a people ſeparate, and to ſecure them from the contagion of Idolatry, becauſe wicked Prieſts and Politicians would eſtabliſh *ſuperſtitious ceremonies* to keep communities enſlaved to civil and religious Tyrants. Theſe ſcrupulous Gentlemen might as well have told us, GOD ſhould not have given us Riches, Knowledge, and Power, becauſe there have been

ſuch men as CHARTRES, SPINOZA, and MULY MOLECH.

But to go on with his Lordſhip's veracity.

5. He aſſerts, that *they* [the Jews] *made beaſts* ACCOUNTABLE LIKE MORAL AGENTS[6]. He is aware that *to mitigate this abſurdity*, as he expreſſes it, both the Jewiſh and Chriſtian commentators ſay, the pain inflicted on beaſts was to ſhew the heinouſneſs of human crimes—to blot out the memory of a great ſcandal—to puniſh the owner for keeping an unruly beaſt, negligently. But he deſpiſes all theſe ſolutions, as ſo many pitiful evaſions. —Would you believe now that in the ſame breath, and merely to ſhew his reading, he ſhould confute his own falſe aſſertion? *I know nothing more abſurd* (ſays he) *than this, except a cuſtom or law at* ATHENS. *The* WEAPONS *by which a murder had been committed were brought into Court, as if they, too, were liable to puniſhment; and the* STATUE *that had killed a man by it's fall, was, by a ſolemn ſentence of that wiſe people, the Thaſii, founded on a Law of* DRACO, *caſt into the ſea.* Now what was his

[6] Vol. v. p. 79.

Lordſhip

Lordſhip to prove? That Moſes was ſo ignorant a Lawgiver, and the Jews ſo ſtupid a people, that *they made beaſts accountable like moral agents.* And he illuſtrates it by a law of the moſt celebrated Legiſlator and of the politeſt People, *Draco* and the *Athenians*; who made even *weapons and ſtatues, moral agents.* The *Athenians* and *Draco* perhaps would have ſaid, that they enacted theſe laws to ſhew their *abhorrence of murder*, and to *puniſh the careleſs erecter of a ſtatue.* Mere SHIFTS AND EVASIONS, ſays his Lordſhip.

6. Again, "God (ſays he) was FORCED "to indulge the Jews in ſeveral SUPERSTI-"TIOUS prejudices [7], as learned Di-"vines *ſcruple not* to affirm." Had *learned Divines* no more *ſcruples*, in *affirming*, than his Lordſhip, I ſhould hardly have undertaken their defence.

What they *ſcruple not* to ſay is this—That IDOLATROUS WORSHIP was never ſo entirely corrupt, but that ſome of it's Rites ſtill continued rational, or, at leaſt, remained innocent; and might be uſed in the ſervice of the true God, *without ſuperſtition:*

[7] Vol. iv. p. 30.

That

That the Iſraelites being fond of Egyptian ceremonies, God indulged them in the uſe of ſuch as were harmleſs, and of no other. Nay, his Lordſhip's cenſure, which follows, ſeems to ſhew this was all their crime. He calls theſe Divines *bold Judges of the principles and views of God's proceedings* [8]. For it is more than probable, had they given him the advantage, he ſpeaks of, againſt the *Moſaic Law*, they had never incurred his diſpleaſure. But in what does the temerity of theſe *bold Judges* conſiſt? In this, That God always chuſes to take the *ordinary* means, before the *extraordinary*, when either may be made indifferently to ſerve his purpoſe. And that, therefore, he rather choſe to indulge the Jews in their fondneſs for old habits, and to turn their propenſities for *Egyptian* Rites upon ſuch as were innocent, than to give them new habits, and new propenſities, by a miraculous force impreſſed upon the mind, which ſhould overrule their wills and affections.

7. WE KNOW (ſays his Lordſhip) THAT ALL THEIR [the Jews] SACRED WRITINGS WERE COMPILED AFTER THEIR

[8] P. 32.

CAPTI-

CAPTIVITY [9]. Balzac ſpeaks of a certain Critic who uſed to boaſt, that no body, beſides God and himſelf, knew the meaning of this or that verſe in Perſius. His Lordſhip's [WE KNOW] is juſt ſuch another revelation. Only the Critic's *meaning* might be true; but the Philoſopher's *knowledge* is certainly falſe. A falſehood ſo notorious, that I am in ſome doubt whether this ſtricture belong properly to his *dogmatic* or to his *laconic* ſtyle. For *we know*, may ſignify—*We know that the* SPURIOUS ESDRAS *ſays ſo.* And then he gets the two things he moſt wants; a *very uſeful Truth*, and a *very noble Authority*.

8. " The Juſtice, [of the great day] (ſays " his Lordſhip) IF IT MAY BE CALLED " JUSTICE, moſt certainly requires that " rewards and puniſhments ſhould be " meaſured out, in every particular caſe, " in proportion to the merit and demerit " of each individual. But inſtead of this, " it is aſſumed, conformably to the doc- " trine of PLATO, that the righteous are " ſet on the *right hand* of the Judge, and " the wicked, on the *left*; from whence, " they are tranſported into Heaven, or

[9] Vol. iv. p. 339.

" plunged

" plunged into Hell. They are tried *in-*
" *dividually*, they SEEM to be rewarded
" or punished *collectively*, without any
" distinction of the particular cases, which
" have been so solemnly determined, and
" without any proportion observed be-
" tween the various degrees of merit and
" demerit, of innocence and guilt, in the
" application of these rewards and pu-
" nishments [10]."

If it may be called Justice—Marry, well put in. For who knows but, as this is the general day of accounts, and that men see, such a day will be much wanted; who knows, I say, but, rather than be without any, they may be foolish enough to take up with this? They cannot therefore have their prejudices in favour of it, rectified too soon: Let us not cavil with him therefore, for bringing the justice of this court into question, before he has examined the proceedings of it; but rather content ourselves with admiring the wonders of his reasoning. Should I seriously quote the Words of Jesus, — *In my Father's house are many mansions* [1]: And again, *The servant which knew his Lord's will, neither*

[10] Vol. v. p. 495. [1] John xiv. 2.

did

did according to his will, ſhall be beaten with many ſtripes. But he that knew not, and did commit things worthy of ſtripes, ſhall be beaten with few ſtripes [2]; Should I ſeriouſly, I ſay, quote theſe words, to illuſtrate the truth of this noble writer's obſervation, that men at the great Tribunal *ſeem to be rewarded or puniſhed collectively*, he would, I ſuppoſe, have been amongſt the firſt to laugh at my ſimplicity; at leaſt, the intelligent Reader would not thank me for my diligence.

III. I proceed now to his Lordſhip's CONSISTENCY; the next quality in his philoſophic character. You have ſeen with what bravery he CONTRADICTS *all others*; you ſhall now ſee with what greater bravery he CONTRADICTS *himſelf*.

There are two things which characteriſe the *reaſoning part* of his Lordſhip's writings, (if any part of ſo declamatory a work can be called *reaſoning*) and diſtinguiſh them from all other men's; His INCESSANT REPETITIONS, and his INCESSANT CONTRADICTIONS. Indeed, theſe beauties beget and are begotten of one another. For when a man can furniſh out no better

[2] Luke xii. 47, 48.

enter-

entertainment for his Gueſts than a parcel of groundleſs flams, he will be much ſubject to *repetition*; and every repetition as much ſubject to *variation*; for his tales having neither foundation in Fact, nor meaſure in Truth, they will be always producing, for admiration; and always new modeling, for convenience, as beſt ſuits his preſent paſſions and purpoſes.

His REPETITIONS I leave for the refreſhment of thoſe who are diſpoſed to read him through: This ſhort ſpecimen of his CONTRADICTIONS I propoſe for a more general entertainment.

But as profeſſed *Anſwerers* never abuſe our underſtandings and our patience more than in this kind of diſcoveries; it may not be amiſs, to ſay a word or two of a *ſpecies of accuſation*, which *ſuch* men are always ready to urge on the very ſlighteſt occaſion, for the convenience which attends it; the convenience of making an Author confute himſelf when the *Anſwerer* is unable ſo to do.

Sometimes the imaginary *inconſiſtence* ariſes out of the ſlow or cloudy apprehenſion of the *Anſwerer*, when the *Author* is too brief or too refined: ſometimes from the

the inaccurate expreſſion of the *Author*, when the *Anſwerer* is too haſty or too captious. It ſometimes ariſes from the Anſwerer's prejudices; and ſometimes again from the Author's prevarication.

Nay (which is ſtranger ſtill) the more exact the diſtinctions are, and the more correct the expreſſion, (and the correcter and exacter they will be in proportion to the Author's knowledge of *words* and *things*) the more ſhall the diſcourſe abound with *theſe inconſiſtencies*. For a heavy or a precipitate *Anſwerer*, will never be able to diſtinguiſh SIMILAR things from IDENTICAL.

Prejudice for a ſet of Opinions may make an *Anſwerer* miſtake ſome things to be in Nature, what they are only in the combinations of the Schools; and finding them conſidered differently (that is, under other aſſociations) by his adverſary who may have no prejudices, or prejudices of another kind, he will be extreme ready to call theſe *differences*, by the more commodious name of *contradictions*.

Laſtly, the *Author*, if he be a FREE-THINKER, has a kind of right, by preſcription, to two or three, or indeed, to

two or three dozen of *Characters*, as beſt ſuits his purpoſe, or errand: A practice, which, being begun under a want of Liberty, was continued out of Licentiouſneſs, and is ſtill kept up for the ſake of it's Conveniences. Now if ſuch a one be too lazy to aſſume a *perſonated Character* in form, then, (as Lord Shaftſbury obſerves) *a dull kind of* IRONY *which amuſes all alike*, becomes his favorite figure of ſpeech. But with ſuch a Writer, an inattentive or plain-dealing Anſwerer may give himſelf much trouble, to collect his *contradictions*, and all, to be well laughed at for his pains.

I have fairly marked out theſe various deluſions, that You may have it in your power to detect me, ſhould I be tempted to impoſe upon You, myſelf. Not that I claim much merit from this fair dealing; for his Lordſhip's CONTRADICTIONS are ſo groſs and ſubſtantial, numerous and obvious, that I was under no temptation to make out my ſpecimen by any thing doubtful or equivocal.

1. "I could not (ſays his Lordſhip) "have diſcovered, as NEWTON did, that "*univerſal law* of corporeal Nature, which "he has demonſtrated. But further than

" that, he could go no more than I; nor
" discover the ACTION OF THE FIRST
" CAUSE, BY WHICH THIS LAW WAS IM-
" POSED ON ALL BODIES, AND IS MAIN-
" TAINED IN THEM [3]." Here, he owns ATTRACTION not to be a REAL or an essential PROPERTY OF MATTER, but *the action of the first cause* upon it. Yet in another place he observes, that " ATTRACTION MAY BE, notwithstanding all the SILLY abstract reasoning to " the contrary, A REAL PROPERTY OF " MATTER [4]." The truth is, that, for any thing his Lordship knew of this *universal Law*, or of the *silly abstract reasoning* concerning it, ATTRACTION might be Action, Passion, Magic, or the Man in the Moon. He only followed his leader, Mr. COLLINS, who displayed the same Philosophic spirit in speaking of GRAVITY, the *effect* of *Attraction*: And CLARKE's animadversion on his knowledge will exactly suit his Lordship's.— " Not content " to have erred so very grosly in the first " foundation of all natural Philosophy; " you could not forbear professing further, " that *you have often admired that* GRA-

[3] Vol. iv. p. 8. [4] Vol. iii. p. 547.

" VITATION *ſhould be eſteemed a matter*
" *of ſuch difficulty amongſt Philoſophers;*
" *and that you think it to be ſo evi-*
" *dent and neceſſary an effect of mat-*
" *ter in conſtant motion perpetually ſtriking*
" *one part againſt another, that you won-*
" *der every body ſhould not ſee it.* I ſup-
" poſe the reſt of the world will no leſs
" *admire* at *you*, for imagining that, by
" ſo ſlight an admiration, you could at
" once ſet aſide all the propoſitions in that
" moſt excellent book [the *Principia* of
" Newton] wherein it is made appear by
" ſtrictly mathematical demonſtrations,
" drawn from the Laws of motion, now
" agreed on by Mathematicians, and
" eſtabliſhed by experiments, and from
" the Phænomena of the heavenly bo-
" dies; that the preſent operations of na-
" ture, depending upon gravitation, can-
" not poſſibly be mechanical effects of
" *matter in conſtant motion perpetually*
" *ſtriking one part againſt another.*—Upon
" the whole, all that you have advanced
" about *gravitation* is ſuch marvellous
" reaſoning, to be made uſe of in the
" preſent age, after ſo many great diſco-
" veries, founded upon experience, and

" even

" even mathematical demonſtration; that
" tho' I have no cauſe at all to be diſplea-
" ſed with you for arguing in ſuch a man-
" ner; yet, I believe, your readers cannot
" but think you might very well have for-
" born going out of your way, to give ſo
" very diſadvantageous a repreſentation *of*
" *your own* Philoſophy [5]."

2. In one place, his Lordſhip tells us, *that the right of the Iſraelites to the Land of Canaan was founded on the* PROPHECY *of Noah:* in another, that *it was founded on the* PROMISE *to Abraham.* Second thoughts are beſt. He ſeems here to be a little nearer the truth. For tho' a *promiſe* may intitle to a poſſeſſion, I do not ſee how a *propheſy* can do more than foretel one: Unleſs his Lordſhip has ſome ethical engine of a new invention, to extend the grounds of *Obligation,* unknown to GROTIUS, SELDEN, and CUMBERLAND: yet they travelled for it; and, if we may believe his Lordſhip's account of their famous *Journey to Paris,* ſpared for no room in laying foundations. But, in this affair of the PROMISE, his Lordſhip *inſinuates* an

[5] Clarke's third defence of the immateriality and natural immortality of the Soul, againſt Collins.

 untruth;

untruth; which is a great deal meaner than *telling* one: For he repreſents it as capricious, arbitrary, and without any reaſon aſſigned.

3. "The Jews (ſays his Lordſhip) as "often as they made God deſcend from "Heaven, and as much as they made "him reſide on earth, were *far from cloath-* "*ing him with corporeity*, and imputing "corporeal vices to him [7]."

Yet two or three pages forward, ſo prevalent is the luſt of abuſe, he expreſsly ſays, *they* DID *cloath him with* CORPOREITY.

Theſe are his words: "The Jewiſh "Scriptures aſcribe to God not only cor- "poreal appearance, but corporeal action, "and all the inſtruments of it; eyes to "ſee, ears to hear, mouth and tongue to "articulate, hands to handle, and feet to "walk [8]." You will ſay, perhaps, that his Lordſhip meant, the Scriptures indeed aſcribed all this to God; but in a *figurative*, not in a literal, ſenſe. I would have ſaid ſo too, but that his Lordſhip goes on rating the Divines for underſtanding the ſcripture-repreſentation in a *figurative* ſenſe.

[7] Vol. v. p. 515. [8] P. 519.

Which,

Which, too, he ſhews does not mend the matter; this *figurative* ſenſe being ſtolen from Epicurus. Now we know that Epicurus certainly believed the Gods to be CORPOREAL (if he believed any) tho' made of a finer ſtuff than mere mortal bodies. "Divines (ſays his Lordſhip) tell "us indeed, that we are not to underſtand "all this according to the literal ſignifi-"cation, &c. But this *flimſy theological* "*veil* thrown over the literal ſignification "is ſtolen from the wardrobe of Epicu-"rus [9]." His Lordſhip's wardrobe ſeems to be as rich as Epicurus's, in VEILS: a little after, we have a very curious one, *a thin and trite* VEIL *of analogy*: and he is ready to lend them to Divines, as Lucullus did his cloaks *to* the Players, by the dozen.

But whenever his Lordſhip ſpeaks of CHRISTIANITY, a kind of fatality attends him; and his contradictions have then neither ſtop nor meaſure.

4. Speaking of the *laſt Supper*, he ſays, "The perſon by whom it was inſtituted "is repreſented ſometimes under images, "that render it impoſſible to frame any,

[9] P. 519.

" of the EFFICACY, or even of the INSTI-
" TUTION, of this Sacrament. Chriſt is a
" *vine*, he is a *rock*, nay he is a *coat*,
" according to St. Paul," &c.[10]. And yet no further off than four pages, he ſays,
" There is no one [figurative expreſſion]
" perhaps in the whole Goſpel, leſs liable
" to any equivocal ſenſe than that which
" Chriſt employed when he ſaid, *This is*
" *my body*, and *this my blood*, in the very
" act of giving bread and wine to his Diſ-
" ciples, who were at ſupper with him,
" juſt before his death, for a remembrance
" of which, this ceremony of a ſupper was
" then inſtituted by him. The figure
" was eaſy, the application natural, and
" they could not underſtand the expreſſion
" literally [1]."

His Lordſhip, as you may well think, has commonly *different* purpoſes to ſerve by his contradictions. Here it is one and the *ſame*: to diſcredit a Goſpel inſtitution: which is equally done by ſhewing it to be myſterious, obſcure, and incomprehenſible, where it pretends to clearneſs and preciſion; and low, trite, and mean, where it pretends to ſomething auguſt, peculiar,

[10] Vol. iv. p. 592. [1] P. 596.

and

and in the higheſt degree efficacious. All the fault in this caſe, except his Lordſhip's moſt profound ignorance of the nature of the Rite [2], is his bringing theſe two curious obſervations ſo near to one another.

5. "Chriſtianity (ſays his Lordſhip) "as the Saviour publiſhed it, was full "and ſufficient to all the purpoſes of it. "Its ſimplicity and plainneſs ſhewed that "it was deſigned to be the religion of man-"kind, and manifeſted likewiſe the divi-"nity of it's original [3]." This is very gracious. Yet the Scene changes with his Lordſhip's humour; and the *ſimplicity* and *plainneſs* become *dark*, *ambiguous*, and *incomprehenſible*. "That there are "many ambiguous expreſſions, many dark "ſayings, in the Goſpel; MANY DOC-"TRINES, which reaſon could never have "taught, nor is able to comprehend, "now they are taught, cannot be deni-"ed [4]."

[2] See what is ſaid of it, in the xth diſcourſe, *on the principles of N. and R. Religion*, preached at Lincoln's Inn.

[3] Vol. iv. p. 450. [4] Vol. iv. p. 318.

But let him recover his temper, and Chriſtianity brightens up again, and we ſee it reſtored to his good graces. " The ſyſ-
" tem of Religion (ſays he) which Chriſt
" publiſhed, and his Evangeliſts recorded,
" is a compleat ſyſtem to all the pur-
" poſes of true Religion, natural and re-
" vealed. It contains all the duties of the
" former, it enforces them by aſſerting
" the *divine* Miſſion of the Publiſher,
" who proved his aſſertion at the ſame
" time by his *miracles* [5]." But it is only reſtored to be as ſuddenly depoſed. It's birth is ſo far from being *divine*, that he inſinuates it to be *ſpurious*, and neither better nor worſe than a kind of *Baſtard Platoniſm*. " It is aſtoniſhing to obſerve
" the ſtrange conformity between PLA-
" TONISM and GENUINE CHRISTIANITY
" itſelf, ſuch as it is taught in the original
" Goſpel. We need not ſtand to compare
" them here: Particular inſtances of con-
" formity will occur often enough. In
" general, the *Platonic* and *Chriſtian* Syſ-
" tems have a very near reſemblance, QUA-
" LIS DECET ESSE SORORUM [6]." He then goes on to ſhew, that the common

[5] Vol. iv. p. 314. [6] Vol. iv. p. 340.

Parent

Parent of both was not REASON but ENTHUSIASM.

Enthuſiaſm, you will ſay, is now fairly brought to bed of twins, *Platoniſm* and *Chriſtianity*. No ſuch matter. *Genuine Chriſtianity was taught of God* [7].—" As " it ſtands in the Goſpel it contains a " compleat ſyſtem of Religion: it is in " truth the ſyſtem of natural Religion [8]." Well then, we ſhall hear no more of this *ſiſterly reſemblance* to *Platoniſm*. Perhaps not. But you ſhall hear, and that ſoon too, of as great changes. This Chriſtianity is at laſt found to be derived from JUDAISM; that very JUDAISM, which, he had told us, was it ſelf raiſed on THEFT and MURDER—" On the Re- " ligion of the Jews, and on the Au- " thority of their Scriptures, Chriſtianity " was founded [9]." Again, They who " prefer the example and doctrine of " CHRIST to thoſe of PAUL, will find " reaſon to think that the Meſſiah in- " tended rather to reform and to graft " upon Judaiſm, than to aboliſh it [10]."

[7] Vol. iv. p. 348—9.
[8] Vol. iv. p. 316.
[9] Vol. iv. p. 317.
[10] Vol. iv. p. 350.

And

And again; He accuſes PAUL for preaching a *new Goſpel*, called by the Apoſtle, *my Goſpel:* And this new, or peculiar Goſpel, his Lordſhip tells us *was the Myſtery of God's purpoſe to* TAKE IN THE GENTILES, *ſo* INCONSISTENT *with the declarations and practice of* JESUS [1]. Yet for all this, had Chriſt's Goſpel "been "propagated with the ſame ſimplicity "with which it was originally taught by "CHRIST, it would (he tells us) have "been to the unſpeakable benefit of MAN-"KIND [2]."

Let us now ſum up his Lordſhip's Doctrine concerning the GOSPEL OF JESUS. "The Goſpel is ſimple, clear, and of *divine original:* But it is, at the ſame time, dark, ambiguous, incomprehenſible; and, like it's *Siſter Platoniſm*, the *Iſſue of Enthuſiaſm*.—As Jeſus publiſhed it, the Goſpel is a *compleat Syſtem of Natural Religion*, and tends to the unſpeakable *benefit of mankind:* But as Jeſus publiſhed it, the Goſpel was only a *reform* of that Impoſture *Judaiſm*, on which it was *founded*, and was intended by Jeſus to be *confined to the Jewiſh People*; it being PAUL, who,

[1] Vol. iv. p. 323. [2] Vol. iv. p. 316.

in direct contradiction to the declarations and the practiſes of Jeſus, turned it into a compleat Syſtem of Natural Religion, and made it tend to the *unſpeakable benefit of mankind*, by extending it to the Gentiles." And thus he goes on contradicting his own aſſertions, as faſt as he advances them, from one end of his Eſſays to the other.

The ſame ſelf-contradictions, which confute his own calumnies againſt Chriſtianity ITSELF, ſtill follow him when he comes to ſpeak of the PROPAGATORS of Chriſtianity.

6. "He (ſays this noble Lord) who com-
" pares the Epiſtles of JAMES, of PETER,
" and JOHN, ſuch as we have them, with
" thoſe of PAUL, and all theſe with the
" doctrines of the GOSPEL, will be per-
" haps of my opinion; at leaſt he will
" have no ground to ſay of the three firſt,
" that they were authors of NEW GOSPELS,
" as he will have grounds to ſay of the
" laſt, and as the laſt does in effect ſay of
" himſelf[3]." What was this *new Goſpel?* It was, as we have ſeen juſt before, *the Myſtery of God's purpoſe to take in the Gentiles.* JAMES, PETER, and JOHN,

[3] Vol. iv. p. 320.

there-

therefore, according to his Lordſhip, taught not this myſtery; *ſo inconſiſtent*, as he ſays, with the declarations and practice of Jeſus. Yet ſoon after he confeſſes, that JAMES, PETER and JOHN, did not preach CHRIST's *Goſpel*, but were, together with PAUL, *the Authors* of this NEW GOSPEL. For, ſpeaking of the *Council of Jeruſalem*, he ſays, *The* APOSTLES *had given no directions to inſiſt that the* GENTILES *ſhould or ſhould not, ſubmit to circumciſion, and to the yoaks of the Law* [4]. Which neceſſarily implies a confeſſion, that THEY too were Authors of this new Goſpel, the *Myſtery of God's purpoſe to take in the Gentiles.* The *taking in the Gentiles*, he ſuppoſes a thing agreed on by all the Apoſtles: and that what was yet undone was the ſettling the preciſe *terms* of their admiſſion.

Our Unbelievers look ſo monſtrouſly aſquint upon Religion, that the oppoſite rays of their prejudice are always diſturbing and confounding one anothers effects. Yet, in the general, it requires pains to fix the *contradictions* which ſpring out of theſe fugitive croſs-lights. Commend

[4] Vol. iv. p. 324.

me therefore to the Man who brings his *contradictions* to a point; and requires nothing of you but eye-ſight to comprehend them in their full luſtre.

His *pro* and *con* are always near neighbours. So that we ſhall not be ſurprized to find them at laſt, in the following inſtances, incorporated, as it were, into one another.

7. "I much doubt (ſays his Lordſhip) "whether the EVANGELISTS would un- "derſtand the Epiſtles of St. PAUL, THO' "ONE OF THEM WAS HIS SCRIBE [5]."— It was ſaid of One, that he *believed againſt hope*: a ſubject of much mirth to our *firſt-Philoſophy-Men*.

But what is that, to his Lordſhip's greater ſtrength of mind, who can *doubt againſt certainty!*—PAUL and LUKE agreed to preach the Goſpel together: and not only ſo, but that *Luke's* pen ſhould be employed to convey their common ſentiments, and adventures, to poſterity. And yet he queſtions whether LUKE underſtood PAUL'S EPISTLES.

[5] Vol. iv. p. 202.

Dic

Dic aliquem, ſodes, heic Quintiliane, colorem Hæremus —

—Some body, I ſuppoſe, might tell him, that one of theſe *Evangeliſts* was Paul's Companion, his Amanuenſis and Hiſtorian. But his obſervation being too good to be thrown away, he added with infinite dexterity and addreſs——*tho' one of them was his Scribe.*

8. Again, Speaking of the MORAL ATTRIBUTES, the noble Lord obſerves, " We " make God ſo much a copy of man, " that we deſign the worſt, as well as " the beſt of our own features, if I may " ſo ſay, in our repreſentations of him: " and, as common as it is, no unprejudiced " thinking man can hear, without aſto- " niſhment, our *perfections* and our *im-* " *perfections* imputed to the divine Being " in the ſame breath, and by the ſame " men; with this difference at moſt, that " the former are imputed directly, and " the latter ſometimes under the THIN " AND TRITE VEIL OF ANALOGY. In a " Being thus conſtituted, they may well " imagine that the moral virtues are the

" ſame

" ſame as they are in our ideas: and " Theology may eaſily deduce, from his " attributes, the characters Theology has " given them [6]."

We cannot, ſays his Lordſhip, *without aſtoniſhment ſee our perfections and our imperfections imputed to the divine Being.* His aſtoniſhment is all a flam. There is, indeed, no ſuch *imputation*, even in his own reckoning. For tho' he pretends the *imperfections are imputed*, yet, he ſays, it is *under the thin and trite veil of analogy*. That is, not imputed. For when Scripture ſpeaks of *the outſtretched arm of God, and his all-ſeeing eye*, does it impute *arms* and *eyes* to God, in the ſenſe it imputes *juſtice* and *goodneſs* to him? Yes, ſays he—*under the thin* and *trite veil of analogy*. i. e. *Not* in the ſame ſenſe. As if we ſhould ſay, His Lordſhip AFFIRMS under the *thin and trite veil* of a DENIAL.

This, Sir, is a very ſcanty ſpecimen of his Lordſhip's CONTRADICTIONS. Yet no man appears to be more ſenſible of the diſgrace which CONTRADICTIONS bring upon a writer. For, ſpeaking of the

[6] Vol. v. p. 89.

whole

whole COLLEGE OF APOSTLES, he says, *These inconsistent Writers talk often a different language on the same subject*; *and* CONTRADICT *in one place what they have said in another* [5].

IV. His Lordship's profound LEARNING comes next to be considered.

1. The first instance I shall give, is fetched from the very penetralia of the *first Philosophy*. "Human knowledge is so entirely and solely derived from actual BEING, that, without actual Being, we "should not have EVEN ONE of those simple ideas, whereof all the complex and "abstract notions that TURN OUR HEADS "are composed [6]."

Here, his Lordship cried εὑρηκα, and should have sacrificed a Bull for his discovery: which informs us of no less a truth than this, that *if we had had no Being we should have had no sensation*: in other words, that *qualities* cannot exist without a *substance*. For if, by *actual being* he did not take in the thinker's own, the observation is false: a rational Being, tho' existing singly, has yet the idea of his own existence. But the observation is every way

[5] Vol. iv. p. 489. [6] Vol. iii. p. 411.

extra-

extraordinary. He ſuppoſes our *ſimple* ideas to be real; he ſuppoſes our *complex and abſtract* notions to be compounded of the *ſimple* ideas; and yet he ſuppoſes that the compoſition has TURNED OUR HEADS. Till now, I underſtood it was *fantaſtic*, and not *real* knowledge, which *turned men's heads*. But I forget; His Lordſhip found the *whole World in a frenzy*; and then indeed it is hardly worth while to enquire what ſet them a going.

2. "The PAGANS (ſays his Lordſhip) "do not appear to have interpolated the "antient *Doctors* of Paganiſm; nor is there "any pretence to ſay that THEY have "impoſed any ſpurious books on the "world, under the name of thoſe *Doc-*"*tors* [7]."

ORPHEUS and MERCURIUS TRISMEGISTUS were certainly *Pagan Doctors*, if ever there were any. And did his Lordſhip never hear, that the Books, Hymns, and Poems, come down to us, under their names, were Pagan forgeries? I will not inſiſt upon the SIBYLLINE ORACLES, which CICERO aſſures us had been *interpolated*, (for the Pagans interpolated

[7] Vol. iv. p. 195.

their very forgeries) becauſe I do not know to what conditions his Lordſhip confines the *Doctorate* in the Pagan World, or whether he admits the fair ſex to the honour of the Hood.

However, let us not think him ſo unlearned as not to have heard of theſe forgeries. He had both heard of them, and conſidered them well: And as he is always for putting the ſaddle on the right horſe, (as where he aſcribes *atheiſm* to the *Divines*) he charges all theſe iniquities on the CHRISTIANS. "It was (ſays he) to pro-
"mote the Opinion, that all the Myſte-
"ries of their [the Chriſtians'] Religion,
"had been revealed by the writings of
"*Pagan Philoſophers* many centuries be-
"fore Chriſt, that ſo many books were
"forged under the names of *Mercurius*
"*Triſmegiſtus*, of *Hyſtaſpes*, of the SI-
"BYLS, and perhaps of others."

We are got a good way towards Doctorating theſe old Woman: They are become *Philoſophers*, we ſee. — But whether the Chriſtians were the *only* forgers of *Sibylline Oracles* muſt be left to be decided between Tully and his Lordſhip.

The

The truth is, and who, that underſtands antiquity, ever doubted of it? That ſome paganized Chriſtians learnt this trade of forging Books, under antient names, from thoſe whoſe ſuperſtition they had left, but not that ſpirit of impoſture which ſupported it.

3. "The [greek] Hiſtorians, ſays his "Lordſhip, obſerving how fond their "countrymen were of thoſe who writ "Fables, turned Hiſtory into Romance; "and ſtudied to make their relations mar-"vellous and agreeable, with little regard "to truth, in which they were encourag-"ed, AFTER ALEXANDER'S EXPEDITION "INTO ASIA, by the difficulty of diſ-"proving any thing they ſaid of coun-"tries ſo remote [8]." A vulgar man, and one of thoſe his Lordſhip calls Pedants, would have ſaid, — BEFORE ALEXANDER'S EXPEDITION: becauſe the *difficulty* in a great meaſure ceaſed AFTER that Conquerer had opened, and his Succeſſors had kept open, a communication with thoſe *remote countries*.

4. He calls Ariſtotle's Logic, "the "rules of a Dialectic that ſeemed to prove,

[8] Vol. iv. p. 137—8.

" and DID PROVE indifferently either in " favor of truth or error [9]". Exaggeration is one of his Lordſhip's favorite figures of ſpeech: but here, puſhed a little too far; for, not content with ſaying that Ariſtotle's *rules of ſyllogizing* (for that is what he means by the *rules of a dialectic*) *ſeemed to prove*, he will needs add, *and* DID PROVE. Which ſhews ſuch a knowledge of Syllogiſm, as needed not the following inſtance to ſet it off. " It muſt not " (ſays he) be imagined, that he who " reaſons, or ſeems, rather, to reaſon " cloſely and conſequentially, has there- " fore truth always on his ſide [1]." I deſire to know who ever thought he had, who did not miſtake (as his Lordſhip here ſeems to do) the art of *ranging* arguments, for the Art of *finding* them? " No body " (his *Maſter Locke* would tell him) can " hinder, but that SYLLOGISM, which " was intended for the ſervice of truth, " will ſometimes be made uſe of, againſt " it. But it is NEVERTHELESS ON " TRUTH'S SIDE, AND ALWAYS TURNS " UPON THE ADVERSARIES OF IT [2]."

[9] Vol. iv. p. 158. [1] P. 159.

[2] Second Letter to the Bp. of Worceſter, p. 31—2. 8° Ed. 1697.

6. Speak-

6. Speaking of *Angels*, his Lordſhip thinks fit to hazard this Obſervation: "There is another cauſe of this PNEU-" MATICAL MADNESS, [the belief of " ſuch Beings] the fondneſs of making " *man* paſs for one of thoſe Beings that " participated of the *divine Nature*. This " had long poſſeſſed the heathen Theiſts: " and IT POSSESSED THE CHRISTIANS " WITH MORE ADVANTAGE [3]."

This ſeems demonſtration that his Lordſhip either never read, or at leaſt never underſtood, an antient Apologiſt. The truth is, there was not one extravagance in all Paganiſm, which afforded ſo much advantage to the primitive Chriſtians as this fond opinion of the antient Philoſophers, that the human Soul was *a part or portion of the divine nature*; nor was there any, they were more eager to expoſe: They laboured, indeed, with ſo much warmth, and ſometimes with ſo little diſcretion, that it hath given a handle for ſome learned moderns to pretend that all the antient Fathers believed the *natural mortality of the Soul* [4]. Well, but

[3] Vol. iv. p. 478.
[4] See Dodwell on this Subject.

if the Chriſtians were not *poſſeſſed with this fondneſs*, he will ſhew you, at leaſt, they might have been poſſeſſed with it, and *to more advantage* too. But this part of his Lordſhip's philoſophic Character, his *Reaſoning*, I am not yet come to. However, as we are now upon the borders, it may not be amiſs to uſher it in with this curious argument; which undertakes to prove, that the impious notion of the human Soul's *participating of the divine nature*, *poſſeſſed*, or at leaſt *might have poſſeſſed*, the Chriſtians with *more advantage*, than it did the heathen Theiſts. What then, do you think it is? You will hardly gueſs. It is this, *That Chriſtians are wont to* ASSUME *that man is compounded of body and* SOUL [5]. Well, it muſt needs be allowed, that till we *aſſume*, man has a *Soul*, we can never be *poſſeſſed* with an opinion that his Soul participates of the divine Nature. So much then is admitted, that ſince Chriſtians hold, *man is compoſed of ſoul and body*, they may be *poſſeſſed with advantage*. But how it ſhould be with *more advantage*, than the Heathens, I cannot comprehend. Did

[5] Vol. iv. p. 478.

not

not They, as well as the Chriſtians, hold that man was compoſed of ſoul and body? We need not, I think, any other proof than this notion, of *participation* imputed to them. For they could not, ſure, be ſo abſurd to hold that, *nothing might participate of ſomething*. However, of this I will not be over poſitive, ſince his Lordſhip tells us, they all laboured under an incurable PNEUMATICAL MADNESS.

V. Such an eſcape of his Lordſhip's logic, muſt needs awake us to expect great things from this laſt capital accompliſhment of the *Philoſopher*, his ART OF REASONING: to which, we are now arrived.

1. He will prove againſt LOCKE, that *the notion of Spirit involves more difficulty or obſcurity in it than the notion of body*. Nay, he ſays *he will make* LOCKE *prove this againſt himſelf, that we have more and clearer primary ideas belonging to body than we have of thoſe belonging to immaterial Spirit*. And thus he argues, "Primary ideas are the ideas of ſuch qua-
"lities as exiſt always in the ſubſtance to

" which they belong, whether they are
" perceived or no. They are therefore
" essential to it, and productive, by their
" operations, of those secondary qualities
" which may be said only to exist in our
" perceptions of them. Of the first sort
" are solidity and extension, to mention
" no others, the primary qualities, and, in
" our ideas the essence of Matter, of which
" we can frame no conception exclusively
" of them. These notions I have TA-
" KEN FROM MR. LOCKE, and they lead
" me to ask what the primary ideas are of
" spirit or immaterial substance? The
" Primary idea or the essence of it is
" THOUGHT; as body is the *extended*,
" this is the thinking substance, SAYS
" DES CARTES. THOUGHT then, AC-
" TUAL THOUGHT, is the essence of the
" soul or spirit, and, by consequence, so
" inseparable from it, that we cannot
" conceive the Soul or Spirit to exist
" separately from, or exclusively of,
" thought. " But this I know to be
" untrue: and I may well own, since
" Locke has owned the same, that I
" have *one of those dull Souls that does*

" not

" *not perceive itſelf always to contemplate*
" *ideas* [6]."

Won't you naturally ſuſpect him of foul play, when you find him employing the language of one Philoſopher, to confute the ſentiment of another? He is arguing againſt LOCKE concerning the equal or ſuperior evidence of the primary qualities of *Body* and *Spirit*, and he takes DES-CARTES's definition of the primary qualities of *Spirit*, to make out his point. In plain truth, he puts the change upon us: he uſes *thought*, or *actual thinking*, for the *faculty of thinking*. It is this Laſt which is *eſſential* to the ſoul and inſeparable from it: It is this laſt, which being a *power* is properly predicated of an *Agent*: It is this laſt which Locke underſtood to be the *primary idea of a ſpirit or immaterial ſubſtance*, when he ſaid that *the notion of Spirit involves no more difficulty nor obſcurity in it than that of body*: And it is the laſt, of which it may be truly ſaid, that *we cannot conceive the ſoul or ſpirit to exiſt ſeparately from, or exclu-ſively of it.*

[6] Vol. iii. p. 510—11.

2. His Lordſhip owns, that *it is above humanity to comprehend that virtue, whatever it be, whereby one Being acts upon another, and becomes a cauſe.*

"Whatever knowledge (ſays he) we ac-
" quire of *apparent cauſes*, we can acquire
" none of *real cauſality*: by which, I
" mean, that force, that power, that vir-
" tue, whatever it be, by which one Be-
" ing ACTS on another, and becomes a
" cauſe. We may call this by different
" names according to the different effects
" of it; but to know it in its firſt princi-
" ples, to know the nature of it, would
" be *to know as God himſelf knows*, and
" therefore this will be always unknown
" to us *in cauſes that ſeem to be moſt under*
" *our inſpection*, as well as in thoſe that
" are the moſt remote from it [7]."

Would you believe, now, that it was but a little before, in this very *Eſſay*, that for want of this knowledge, (which yet to affect even *in cauſes that ſeem to be moſt under our inſpection*, would be to affect *knowing as God himſelf knows*) he denies the Soul to be a ſubſtance diſtinct from body. "They (ſays he) who hold

[7] Vol. iii. p. 551.

" the

" the hypotheſis of two diſtinct ſub-
" ſtances MUST EXPLAIN in ſome tolera-
" ble manner, *which they have not yet done*,
" the union, and MUTUAL ACTION ON
" ONE ANOTHER, of unextended and ex-
" tended Beings, or elſe deny the abſolute
" exiſtence of any thing extrinſical to the
" mind [8]."

That is, thoſe who hold the hypotheſis of two diſtinct Subſtances muſt either do that which he holds no Being but the omniſcient can do; or they muſt run mad; or (which I think is ſomething worſe) they muſt ſurrender up themſelves to his Lordſhip's guidance.

He employs the ſame arms to combat INSPIRATION; and with the ſame advantage. The Notion of which is idle and viſionary, becauſe " He has *no*
" *more conception of this ſuppoſed* AC-
" TION *of the divine, on the human*
" *mind*, than he has of the inſpiration by
" which the Holy Ghoſt proceeds from
" the Father and Son, according to the de-
" ciſion of the council of Florence."
That is, he rejects *Inſpiration* becauſe he does not comprehend that virtue *by which*

[8] Vol. iii. p. 521, 2.

one Being acts upon another and becomes a Cause; altho' he owns none but God can comprehend it.

But his argument against the *existence* of the SOUL, and the *reality* of INSPIRATION, is doubly faulty. For not only, to reject a *revealed truth*, when the proposition in which it is contained is unaccompanied with that explanation of the *cause* which our faculties are INCAPABLE of comprehending, is folly and extravagance; but, to reject it even then, when the proposition is unaccompanied with the explanation which our faculties are CAPABLE of comprehending, is unreasonable.

3. His Lordship endeavours to shew, that a *future State was not the Sanction of the Law or Religion of Nature.* And how does he go about it? — "Sanctions must "be contained in the Law to which they "belong; they must be a part of it. In "their promulgation, they must precede, "as the Law does, necessarily, all acts of "obedience, or disobedience to it; — they "must be as public — These conditions are "essential, there can be no sanction with-"out them. And therefore the rewards

" of *a future State*, which have not theſe
" conditions, are no ſanctions of the natu-
" ral Law. Reaſon and experience, that
" taught men this Law, ſhewed them
" the ſanctions of it. But neither of them
" pointed out *theſe*. Have we any grounds
" to believe, that they were known to the
" antediluvian World? Do they ſtand at the
" head or tail of the SEVEN PRECEPTS
" GIVEN TO THE SONS OF NOAH? Were
" they ſo much as mentioned by Mo-
" SES [9]?"

Can you poſſibly forbear laughing? Had he found a *future ſtate* in the *ſeven precepts* of *Noah*, or in the *books of Moſes*, be aſſured he would have employed this lucky circumſtance to prove, that a *future ſtate* was not the Sanction of the *Law of Nature*, but the ſanction of a *poſitive Law*, or of a *pretended Revelation*. For in the beginning of this very ſection, has he not attempted to prove it was ſo, from its being found in the GOSPEL? " God (ſays he) has
" given a Law, the *Law of Nature and*
" *Reaſon*, to all his human Creatures:
" the *Sanctions* of it are a NATURAL
" TENDENCY of virtue to the happi-

[9] Vol. v. p. 512—13.

" nefs, and vice to the mifery, of man-
" kind —They are imperfect —To fupply
" the imperfection [Revelation pretends]
" that there muft be neceffarily fome *fur-*
" *ther fanctions* of this Law, and thefe are
" the rewards and punifhments referved
" to a FUTURE STATE. Here is ample
" room for *reflexions* [10]." —— In truth there is: and I have juft given you a very obvious one, for a fample.

4. He tells us, that *the worfhip of the one true God was not the firft Religious Worfhip*. The BIBLE fays it was. No matter for that. The BIBLE is a farrago of inconfiftencies [1]. " *Methufalem* (he " fays) faw both *Adam* and *Noah*, to " both of whom God revealed himfelf in " his Unity. *Shem*, the Son of *Noah*, " lived even to the days of *Abraham*. " Need I ftay to fhew HOW IMPOSSIBLE " it is for any man IN HIS SENSES to be-" lieve that a tradition derived from God " himfelf, through fo *few generations*, was " loft amongft the greateft part of man-" kind; or that Polytheifm and Idolatry " were eftablifhed on the ruins of it in the " days of *Serug*, before thofe of *Abraham*,

[10] Vol. v. p. 511—12. [1] Vol. iv. p. 19.

" and

" and ſo ſoon after the Deluge? I ſhould
" think it IMPOSSIBLE even for the Jews
" themſelves to ſwallow ſo many fables
" and ſo many anacroniſms. Since the
" unity of God was not univerſally taught
" in thoſe early days, it was not ſo *reveal-*
" *ed*, nor preſerved in the manner aſ-
" ſumed. [2]."

This account therefore, he tells us, is INCONSISTENT with itſelf [3]. You will wonder perhaps how it comes to paſs, that theſe two propoſitions, *The Unity was revealed by God to Adam—and the knowledge of it was loſt in a very few generations*—ſhould be ſo unable to ſtand together. The beſt anſwer I can give you is, that his Lordſhip was more attentive to his own paſſionate ſpeeches—*no man in his ſenſes can believe*—*It is impoſſible for the Jews themſelves to ſwallow ſuch fables and anacroniſms*—than to the FACTS which occaſioned all this reſentment. The utmoſt that even Prejudice, in its ſenſes, can make of the Scripture account, is an IMPROBABILITY: and this *improbability*, his Lordſhip himſelf, but two pages afterwards, is ſo good to remove for us. He delivers it as

[2] Vol. iv. p. 20. [3] Vol. iv. p. 19.

a general

a general Truth, that " the Vulgar EASI-
" LY embrace Polytheiſm and Idolatry,
" even AFTER the true doctrine of the di-
" vine unity has been taught and received;
" as we may learn from the example of
" the *Iſraelites*: and ſuperſtitions GROW
" APACE, AND SPREAD WIDE, where
" *Chriſtianity* has been eſtabliſhed and is
" DAILY TAUGHT, as we may learn
" from the example of the Roman
" Churches [4]."

Now, Sir, I argue thus, If amongſt the *Iſraelites*, Idolatry and Superſtition ſo *eaſily*, ſo frequently, and ſo inſtantaneouſly *ſucceeded*, to the worſhip of the true God, and needed ſuch ſevere puniſhments to bring men back again to reaſon, in a place were many extraordinary means were provided to keep them in their duty; and if, amongſt *Chriſtians*, Idolatry and Superſtition *grow apace and ſpread wide* where the *true doctrine of the unity* is *daily taught*, how can we wonder that in *ſo few generations*, as from *Adam* to *Serug*, Polytheiſm and Idolatry *had eſtabliſhed themſelves on the ruins* of the Unity; and in an Age,

[4] Vol. iv. p. 22.

when

when we hear of no other proviſion for the Truth than the *long lives* of the Patriarchs; and becauſe *Methuſalem ſaw both Adam and Noah?*

If You deny this to have been the caſe of *Jews* and *Chriſtians*, his Lordſhip tells you, You are *out of your ſenſes*: if you own this to have been the caſe of the *Antediluvians*, You are *out of your ſenſes* ſtill. What is to be done? There is but one way; which is, ſubſcribing to his Lordſhip's Wiſdom. But I have ſomething more to ſay of this pretended INCONSISTENCY. — "Can any man in his ſenſes "believe that a Tradition, derived "from God himſelf, ſhould be loſt in "ſo FEW generations, and ſo SOON "after the Deluge?" — How *few*, and how *ſoon*, I beſeech your Lordſhip? I am not captious: I have a ſpecial reaſon for aſking. The Chronology, of this period, is not uniform or conſtant; there is a wide difference in the ſeveral bible-accounts: ſo that I ſuſpect foul play as well as inaccuracy, in your thus putting us off with the vague reckoning of, *ſo few*, and, *ſo ſoon*.

To be plain, tho' the HEBREW Copy makes it no more than *three hundred* years from the Deluge to Abraham; yet the SAMARITAN-PENTATEUCH, the SEPTUAGINT, and JOSEPHUS, reckon about a *thouſand*: time more than ſufficient to ſink *the greateſt part of Mankind into Idolatry and Polytheiſm, ſo early as the days of Serug*. And here lies the difficulty, the beſt Chronologers agree in preferring the *Samaritan*, the *Septuagint* and *Joſephus*, to the *Hebrew Copy*.—But I forget myſelf: His Lordſhip has "a thorough contempt "for the whole buſineſs of the Learned "lives of SCALIGER, BOCHART, PETA-"VIUS, USHER, and MARSHAM [5]. *To whom* (he ſays) *the whole tribe of ſcholars bow with reverence*, and conſequently he muſt have the ſame contempt for CHRONOLOGY: Which, indeed, he has ſhewn on more occaſions than one; but never to ſo much advantage, as when he ſuppoſed LIVY and TACITUS to have flouriſhed before VIRGIL [6].

[5] Vol. ii. p. 261, 2.

[6] See Dr. NEWTON's learned and judicious *Diſſertations on the Propheſies*, p. 33.

But

But this by the way only. My buſineſs with his Lordſhip at preſent lies in another quarter.

For, having thus (in his attempt to ſhew that the worſhip of the one true God was not the firſt religious worſhip) thrown the BIBLE out of the account, he goes on in this manner:

" If the *inconſiſtency* of this account " makes us reject it, we ſhall find leſs " reaſon to believe, on the Authority of " *prophane traditions*, that the UNITY " OF GOD WAS THE PRIMITIVE FAITH " of mankind. Revelations to the Fa- " ther and to the Reſtorer of the whole " human race might have eſtabliſhed this " faith univerſally: but without Revela- " tion it could not be that of any one " people, till obſervation and meditation, " till a full and vigorous exerciſe of Reaſon " made it ſuch [7]."

The reaſoning is truly admirable. The ſuppoſed Fact, as we find it in ANTIQUITY, ſtands thus, According to the BIBLE, the worſhip of the true God was the firſt religious worſhip: GENTILE TRADITION

[7] Vol. iv. p. 20.

 ſays

ſays much the ſame. Between theſe two Teſtimonies there is a natural and ſtrange connexion. The *Tradition* appears to riſe out of the *Written word*: For, as his Lordſhip well obſerves, *nothing but a Revelation could eſtabliſh this Faith univerſally, not even amongſt one people, till obſervation and meditation had made it familiar to them.* Here you have the Fact proved in the ſtrongeſt manner a Fact can be proved; by the concurrence of two Witneſſes, coming from different quarters, and ſtrangers to one another's evidence; which yet not only agree, but mutually ſupport each other. What would you more?—Hold a little, ſays his Lordſhip, This boaſted connection between ſacred and prophane Hiſtory has no foundation: the *ſacred* is not to be believed, becauſe *inconſiſtent*: the *prophane* is not to be believed, becauſe it has no ſupport but what it receives from the *Sacred*. Thus ſtands his Lordſhip's reaſoning, or, at leaſt, thus it would ſtand had he urged it to the beſt advantage. And to this, I have already replied, that his Lordſhip, in calling the Bible account *inconſiſtent*, is guilty of an abuſe of of words: that

that all which his own premiſſes infer is only an *improbability*; and this *improbability* likewiſe, he himſelf fairly contradicts and confutes. But I go farther, and in defence of the Bible account obſerve, that if what he ſays be true, That *obſervation and meditation and a full and vigorous exerciſe of reaſon*, are neceſſary to gain the knowledge of the UNITY, in a *natural* way; and that theſe qualities are long a coming; it is then highly probable, that the want of this *obſervation and meditation* when the *unity* was revealed to the *firſt Man*, might be the occaſion of the ſpeedy loſs of it. He expreſsly tells us, that this truth has been ſubject to as ſudden revolutions, when men were in full poſſeſſion of it, with all their *obſervation, meditation, and vigorous exerciſe of reaſon*, at the height; and twenty other peculiar advantages to boot.

But his Lordſhip's *general* management of this queſtion, of the FIRST RELIGIOUS WORSHIP, is too curious to be paſſed over in ſilence; tho' it properly belong to a foregoing Head. He diſcuſſes the point at large, in two ſeparate *Diſſertations*:

each of which is ſo well qualified, and ſo fitly accommodated to the other, that the ſecond is a complete confutation of the firſt. How this came about, is not unworthy the Reader's notice. His Lordſhip does things in order. He had firſt of all to diſcredit the Moſaic account of the Creation: And MOSES repreſenting the *worſhip of the true God* as the *original Religion*, he ſat himſelf to prove, that Moſes was both a *fool* and a *liar*. Soon after, he had another Prophet to bring into contempt, the Prophet ISAIAH, who informs us, that the Jews were the only nation under heaven, which had the worſhip of the one God; and this truth EUSEBIUS takes upon his word [8]. His Lordſhip will prove them to be miſtaken. And then he ranſacks all the dark corners, not of antiquity, but of thoſe moderns who have rendered antiquity ſtill darker: in which he ſucceeds ſo well, as to perſuade himſelf that the World, many ages before the foundation of the Jewiſh Republic, had the knowledge of the one God; nay, that there was no time ſo

[8] See *Div. Leg.* Vol. i. Part i. p. 165.

early

early in which the one God was unknown. In a word, he overturns, as we ſaid, and very completely too, every thing he had written on the ſame ſubject, in the other Diſſertation, againſt Moſes. But as all this is directly levelled at the Author of the *Divine Legation of Moſes*, I leave that Writer to do his own argument juſtice as he ſhall find himſelf able.

5. I will now, Sir, give you one of his Lordſhip's *palmary* arguments againſt REVELATION.

" Can he be leſs than MAD who boaſts " a REVELATION ſuperadded to REASON, " to ſupply the defects of it, and who " ſuperadds REASON to REVELATION to " ſupply the defects of this too, at the " ſame time? THIS IS MADNESS OR THERE " IS NO SUCH THING INCIDENT TO OUR " NATURE [9]."

Now as every man, who believes REVELATION, was in theſe circumſtances, his Lordſhip (and reaſon good) concluded the MADNESS to be *univerſal*; and none but himſelf in their ſenſes: and ſtanding thus alone he has thought proper to give us frequent notice of this ex-

[9] Vol. iv. p. 172.

traordinary caſe [10], *Inſanire me aiunt, ultro cum ipſi inſaniant.* But if he will needs reduce mankind to this ſad alternative, I ſhall make no ſcruple to vindicate our common nature, be it never ſo much at his Lordſhip's expence. For, as to the body of mankind, who " hold that " Revelation was ſuperadded to Reaſon, " to ſupply the defects of Reaſon; and that " Reaſon was at the ſame time ſuperadded " to Revelation to ſupply the defects of Re- " velation," I am ſo far from ſeeing in them any of thoſe unfavourable ſymptoms, his Lordſhip ſpeaks of, that I think, whoever had done otherwiſe had deſerved, (at leaſt, on the principles of his Lordſhip's rigid juſtice) to be ſent to Bedlam. Indeed ſome, for ſo doing, have been actually ſent thither. For what, for the moſt part, are the *religious* inhahitants of that place, but ſuch, who, having ſuperadded Revelation to ſupply the defects of Reaſon, WOULD NOT SUPERADD REASON to ſupply the defects of Revelation; but were for making the *Laws of the Goſpel* the ſole rule of all *civil* as well as of *religious* conduct.

[10] Vol. iv. p. 316—353—377.

Let

Let us conſider how the caſe truly ſtands.

The Religioniſt, his Lordſhip ſays, boaſts, that *Revelation* was *ſuperadded to Reaſon*, to *ſupply the defects* of Reaſon. Very well. Reaſon then is the firſt Building; and Revelation, a *ſuperaddition* to it. Revelation meddles not with the work of Reaſon, but ſupplies us with new truths, where Reaſon ſtops ſhort. And why was this done?—For the ſake of an ADEQUATE RULE OF LIFE. Is Reaſon *alone* this rule?—Then the *ſuperaddition* of Revelation was not wanted. Is Revelation alone the rule?—Then Reaſon was mended and improved to no purpoſe. The ADEQUATE RULE therefore is compoſed of BOTH. But if ſo, When Revelation has been added to Reaſon to ſupply the defects of Reaſon, muſt not Reaſon be added to Revelation to ſupply the defects of Revelation? Muſt not two things, thus related, be mutually applied to aid one another's wants? Reaſon is the foundation; Revelation is the ſuperſtructure. It is agreed the ſuperſtructure is neceſſary to *perfect* the foundation. Muſt it not be owned

owned too, that the foundation is as neceſſary to *bear* the ſupeſtructure?

But, what is more, it is the GOSPEL itſelf, and not *artificial Theology*, which preſcribes this conduct to it's Followers. For the *Goſpel* being to ſerve (as is confeſſed) for a ſuperaddition to the firſt building of *Natural Religion*, it delivers no complete ſyſtem of moral Law, (for which it is ſo often reproached by his Lordſhip) becauſe the general parts of that ſyſtem are to be found in *Natural Religion*. For this defect, if it be one, St. Paul has pointed out the remedy, the ſtudy of *natural Religion*, from whence, together with the *Goſpel*, ſuch a complete ſyſtem may be collected. "Finally, "Brethren, whatſoever things are true, "whatſoever things are honeſt, whatſo-"ever things are juſt, whatſoever things "are pure, whatſoever things are lovely, "whatſoever things are of good report; "If there be any virtue, if there be any "praiſe, think on theſe things [1]." What then is the ſcheme of true CHRISTIANITY, but *the ſuperadding Revelation to Reaſon to ſupply the defects of it; and*

[1] Phil. iv. 8.

the

the ſuperadding Reaſon to Revelation to ſupply the defects of this too at the ſame time?

Indeed, was REVELATION only a REPUBLICATION OF THE RELIGION OF NATURE, his Lordſhip's charge, tho' extravagantly urged, would appear to have ſome foundation. For then *Revelation* muſt be ſuppoſed to be *Religion of nature*, reſtored and perfected: And then to recur back to *Natural Religion* to rectify *Revelation*, after Revelation had been introduced to rectify Natural Religion, would have, tho' none of the marks of *madneſs*, which conſiſts in arguing conſequentially from *falſe* principles, yet great ſymptoms of *folly*, which conſiſts in arguing like his Lordſhip, from the *true*. But he owns Chriſtianity to be founded on the Principle of REDEMPTION. Indeed he is as variable in this, as in moſt other points, and as often repreſents it to be *a republication of the Religion of Nature*: therefore, as *we* have all along made the beſt of his *Contradictions*, e'en let *him* do the ſame; for it ſeems not fit, he ſhould be debarred any advantages of his own providing.

But

But let us ſet his Lordſhip's argument in another light; and turn from his *Philoſophic* to his *Legiſlative* Character; and ſuppoſe him to reaſon thus, (for change but the terms, and the reaſoning will hold juſt as well in *civil* as in *theologic* matters.) " Can he be leſs than mad " who boaſts a *ſyſtem of civil Laws* ſuper-" added to the *natural*, to ſupply the de-" fects of it; and who ſuperadds the *na-" tural* to the *civil*, to ſupply the defects " of this too, at the ſame time?" Now look, what figure the Politician would make, who ſhould thus dictate to his Pupils, even ſuch a one does our noble Theologician make in dictating to all mankind.

Amongſt the numerous abſurdities in this famous argument, I don't know if it be worth while to take notice of one in the expreſſion; for as it ſeems not to be committed with deſign, it hardly deſerves the name of a ſophiſm; and that is, the repetition of the word SUPERADDS: for tho', after the ſuperaddition of Revelation to Reaſon, Reaſon may be ſaid to be *joined* to Revelation; it can never, I think, be ſaid to be *ſuperadded* to it. Becauſe this

would be ſetting the two Laws on one another's ſhoulders, and making each become top and bottom in its turn; and this, after he had owned Reaſon to be the *foundation*; and Revelation, the *ſuperſtructure*.

6. Another of his Lordſhip's *general* objections to *Revelation*, is as follows:

"It is not, (he ſays) in any degree, "ſo agreeable to the notions of infinite "wiſdom that God ſhould deal out his "Revelations BY PARCELS, inſtead of "making a ſyſtem of moral Law, when "he created moral agents, that might "anſwer his WHOLE purpoſe, in all cir-"cumſtances of time, place, and perſons; "JUST AS HE MADE a phyſical ſyſtem of "Laws for the other part, the inanimate "part of his Creation [2]."

Now with his Lordſhip's good leave, I am bold to think the contrary to be more probable: and that too on thoſe very principles of analogy, which his Lordſhip employs, to prove it leſs probable. He argues againſt the likelihood of God's giving the *moral Law*, IN PARCELS, becauſe the *Phyſical Law was given* AT ONCE. This plainly proceeds on a ſuppoſition that

[2] Vol. v. p. 544.

the

the nature of the two ſyſtems is the ſame; and that there is the like conſtancy and regularity in the *moral* as in the *Phyſical*: For unleſs there be the ſame tendency to order, or to diſorder, in two general Syſtems; the means of governing them can never be the ſame. But obedience to their reſpective Laws, in theſe two ſyſtems, is not the ſame: for *paſſive* MATTER, the ſubject of the *phyſical*, obeys, with ſmall irregularities, the Laws impreſſed upon it by it's Creator; but an *active* MIND, the ſubject of the *moral*, is perpetually deviating from that rule of right which the Governor of the world preſcribed for its obſervance.

The method, therefore, of governing in the two Syſtems muſt needs, according to all our ideas of wiſdom, be very different. And the difference which our ſenſes tell us *has* been obſerved, is that which natural reaſon teaches us to conclude, *ſhould* be obſerved; namely, to a *phyſical* ſyſtem (whoſe ſubject would conſtantly and invariably obey) a Law given AT ONCE: and to a *moral* ſyſtem (whoſe ſubject inclined it to frequent diſorders) a Law given IN PARCELS; which might,

from time to time, reform thoſe diſorders as they aroſe.

7. I ſhall conclude my ſpecimen with his Lordſhip's *more particular* objections to his Bible.

Speaking of the civil puniſhment of Idolatry, under the Jewiſh Theocracy, he ſays, "God himſelf was the LEGISLA-" TOR. The Citizens, therefore, of that " commonwealth, who apoſtatized, were " proceeded againſt as traytors and rebels, " guilty of no leſs than high-treaſon. " Let it be ſo. *The objections, of injuſtice* " *and cruelty, to thoſe Laws will remain in* " *their full force*, and be of more weight " to prove them HUMAN, than all theſe " hypotheſes to prove them *divine*. God " was KING, and idolatry was no leſs " than high treaſon; no objection there-" fore can lye againſt the Puniſh-" ment of it. None certainly, but every " objection to the MANNER and DEGREE " in which this puniſhment was to be in-" flicted, ſtands good [3]."

Here his Lordſhip, to make amends, as it were, for his frequent *denial of the right* without underſtanding the Caſe, has,

[3] Vol. v. p. 193.

for

for once, ventured to *agree to it*, upon the ſame terms. It hath been ſaid, " that God " being KING of the Jews, idolatry was " high treaſon." To this, his Lordſhip con-deſcends. But to ſhew us how well he underſtood the principle on which it ſtands, he affirms that God's being their LEGISLATOR made Idolatry high treaſon. As if the bare giving Laws to a people conferred the MAGISTRACY on the Giver; or as if there could be *high treaſon* againſt any but the *ſupreme civil Magiſtrate*. But you ſhall ſee more of his talent for PHILOSOPHIC POLITICS, if it fall in my way (as perhaps it will) to ſpeak of his abilities in his own trade. It is his *reaſoning* on the ſubject, not his general *knowledge* of it (things rarely to be found together in his Lordſhip's *Eſſays)* that I now propoſe to examine.

You obſerve then, he owns Idolatry, in Judea, to be high Treaſon; and the Puniſhment of it (which is every where *capital)* to be juſt. But the *manner* and *degree* of that puniſhment he pronounces, both *unjuſt* and *cruel*. Was this like a philoſophic Legiſlator!—When the queſtion is of

the

the *juſtice* or *injuſtice* of a public Law, every man of common ſenſe, and endowed with the inſtinctive knowledge of *right and wrong*, may paſs a true judgment on it; becauſe it ſtands on the unalterable nature of things: in *human* Laws, on the relation between Magiſtrate and Subject; in *divine* Laws, on the relation between God and man; and in a Syſtem of Laws, like the Moſaic, on one and the other, in conjunction. Now his Lordſhip, in paſſing judgment on the caſe, upon theſe principles, pronounces the Law againſt Idolatry to be right and equitable. What can be more honourable for this part of the Jewiſh Syſtem? It is Lord Bolingbroke who decrees in favour of it; and is aided in his judgment by the plaineſt and cleareſt principles. Hold, ſays his Lordſhip; take this along with you, *Tho' no objection can lie againſt the* PUNISHMENT, *yet every objection lies againſt the* MANNER *and* DEGREE *of it.*

Let us ſee then whether the latter part of this decree ſtands upon the ſame plain and clear principles with the former.

To judge truly of the *manner* and *degree* of a Puniſhment, I apprehend, more is requiſite, than to judge of the Puniſhment it ſelf; it requires an intimate acquaintance with the People to whom this Law againſt idolatry was given; their manners, tempers, diſpoſitions, prejudices, and ſituation; In a word, the knowledge of a thouſand circumſtances, which none but the Lawgiver himſelf could perfectly underſtand; certainly, not this Politician of Yeſterday. So that, it appears, the juſtice or injuſtice of the *manner* and *degree* of a puniſhment is not determinable on thoſe ſimple and ſteddy principles, which determine the juſtice or injuſtice of the *puniſhment* itſelf, but on others, which take their different natures of *right and wrong* from many ſhifting circumſtances; from the degree of *temptation* in the object; from the degree of *prejudice* in the affections; of *propenſity* to the Crime; of *malignity* to the Syſtem; and from other various conſiderations, of which only thoſe who are perfect in the knowledge of antient manners in general, and of the Jewiſh People's in particular, can form any tolerable ideas.

This

This is enough to ſhew the folly of cavilling at the *manner* and *degree* of a puniſhment, after the puniſhment itſelf is allowed to be juſt and right. But this is not all; the very allowance of the *puniſhment* implies a preſumption in favour of the *manner* and *degree*. The *Puniſhment*, examined, on plain and clear principles, is found to be juſt: admit now, the *manner* and *degree* of it to be doubtful, for want of knowledge ſufficient to ſhew us the *neceſſity*, and conſequently, the *juſtice* of them. Is it not fair to infer, that the Lawgiver, who obſerved the rule of juſtice in the puniſhment itſelf, obſerved it likewiſe in the *manner* and *degree* of the puniſhment?

But his Lordſhip's cavil at the *degree*, will, perhaps, deſerve our more particular notice. *Moſes* makes the puniſhment, capital, but with no unuſual circumſtances of cruelty attending the kind of death, more than we ſee inflicted for high treaſon in all the Countries of Europe at preſent. The inſtance of *Naboth* ſhews it to have been attended with *confiſcation*. This circumſtance perhaps might have diſguſted his Lordſhip. But in a caſe, where he was

perſonally prejudiced, he ſhould have miſtruſted his own judgment; he ſhould have tried the force of thoſe arguments, by which a great Lawyer had lately evinced, that *forfeitures for high treaſon* is perfectly juſt and equitable.

8. The noble Lord, haranguing on the conditions of *Hiſtorical Authenticity*, delivers this, for one of the chief, "That "the Facts, the principal Facts at leaſt, "be confirmed by COLLATERAL TES-"TIMONY. By collateral teſtimony (ſays "he) I mean the teſtimony of thoſe who "had no common intereſt of Country, of "Religion, or of Profeſſion, to diſguiſe "or falſify the truth [4]."

This condition of *hiſtorical Authenticity* will be eaſily agreed to; as well as his definition of *collateral teſtimony*: And the quotations of JOSEPHUS and EUSEBIUS, from *Egyptians*, *Phœnicians*, *Chaldeans* and *Greeks*, will, without doubt, be urged by the defenders of Religion, as SUCH *collateral teſtimony*, where the witneſſes *had no common intereſt of Country, of Religion, or of Profeſſion to diſguiſe or falſify the truth.*— Pardon me, ſays his Lordſhip, "JO-

[4] Vol. iii. p. 281.

" SEPHUS indeed attempts to ſupport his
" hiſtory [the Bible] by *collateral teſti-*
" *monies*, thoſe of *Egyptians*, *Phœnicians*,
" *Chaldeans*, and even *Greeks*. But theſe
" teſtimonies, were they never ſo full to
" his purpoſe, would CEASE TO BE COL-
" LATERAL teſtimonies, by COMING
" THRO' HIM, who had a common inter-
" eſt of Country and Religion to diſguiſe
" and to falſify the truth [5]."

This ſeems a little hard, that, when our advantages of defence are, in his Lordſhip's opinion, ſo rare, the few we have, ſhould be loſt the very moment they are gained. JOSEPHUS has no ſooner ſeized this important mark of *hiſtorical authenticity*, but it ſlips thro' his fingers as he is urging it: and, what is ſtill more extraordinary, BECAUSE he urges it. The *Book of life* and the *Seat of life*, it ſeems, have this property in common —

" Like following LIFE thro' Creatures you
" diſſect,
" You loſe it in the moment you detect.

For, as Tully well obſerves, all human things are given to change. " Corpora noſtra non

[5] Vol. iii. p. 281.

" novimus.

" novimus. Itaque *Medici* ipſi, quorum
" intererat ea noſſe, aparuerunt ut vide-
" rentur: nec eo tamen aiunt EMPIRICI
" notiora eſſe illa, quia poſſit fieri ut pate-
" facta et detecta, MUTENTUR."

But to illuſtrate this wonderful reaſoning, let us make a ſuppoſition, or rather, let us lay down a *fact*, that APION had inſiſted on this very *condition of hiſtorical authenticity*; and that JOSEPHUS, who defended the Bible againſt him, agreed to put the iſſue of the debate upon it: And ſo produced the teſtimony of *Egyptians*, *Phœnicians*, *Chaldeans*, and even *Greeks*, to ſupport the ſacred ſtory. Thus far, his Lordſhip will allow that matters went fairly on, and the argument had its proper efficacy. JOSEPHUS quoted from the Works of *Pagan* writers, tranſmitted to him thro' the hands of *Pagan* readers; and being engaged with a clear-ſighted Adverſary, without doubt, quoted exactly. The *hiſtorical authenticity* of the BIBLE therefore was eſtabliſhed on the terms his Adverſary required.

How then comes it to paſs, that an argument which was once concluſive, has now loſt its force? What was truth in that

Age muſt be truth in this; or not only the *Authenticity*, but the very *being* of Hiſtory will become precarious.

Do theſe pagan teſtimonies, in running thro' the chanel of JOSEPHUS, become *polluted*, as ſoon as the original books ceaſe to exiſt? No, ſays his Lordſhip; but they become *ſuſpected*. Indeed, if he could prove that JOSEPHUS deſtroyed them; or was aiding in their deſtruction; or had a fore-knowledge of their loſs, his Lordſhip might have ſome reaſon to *ſuſpect*. But to talk of ſuſpicion, merely becauſe JOSEPHUS was *intereſted* that the quotations ſhould be to his purpoſe, is ſo vague an objection, as ſhews that ſuch an anſwerer will never be without his cavils. Were the Originals ſtill in being, he would then *ſuſpect* that theſe paſſages had been foiſted in by ſome Jewiſh or Chriſtian Impoſtor; at leaſt, by ſome body or other, who *had a common intereſt of Country, of Religion, or of Profeſſion, to diſguiſe or falſify the truth.* In ſhort, he would *ſuſpect* all the World rather than give up what he had once maintained.

To ſhew you, this is ſaid neither at random nor in malice, conſider his Lordſhip's

conduct where this *collateral teſtimony* is circumſtanced as he himſelf requires.

The defenders of Religion ſay, that the PENTATEUCH, which repreſents MOSES as the Leader and Legiſlator of the Iſraelites, is ſupported by that *evidence* which his Lordſhip calls *collateral*. What ſays his good Lordſhip to this? "Be it ſo, that "the Iſraelites had a Leader and Legiſla-"tor called Moſes is proved by the con-"ſent of *Foreign*, whom I call *collateral* "*Evidences*. But ſurely it will not fol-"low, that this man CONVERSED WITH "THE SUPREME BEING FACE TO FACE, "which theſe *collateral* Witneſſes do not "affirm [6]"

Thus you ſee, theſe *collateral evidences* will always be rejected, whether they tell their ſtory *viva voce*, or whether their depoſitions be taken down by ſuch who avail themſelves of their teſtimony.

——But, *they do not ſay that this man converſed with the ſupreme Being face to face*. Would his Lordſhip have believed them, if they did? Why, no, ſays he, I muſt needs reckon ſuch relations amongſt the Miracles of the Greek and Roman

[6] Vol. iii. p. 282.

Hiſtorians,

Hiſtorians. Very well, my Lord. And does not this ſhew, that if the *collateral evidence* ſpeak but to Moſes' Legiſlation and civil rule, they ſpeak to every thing they are called for. — It is doubted, for inſtance, whether Livy relates truly the operations of ſuch or ſuch a campaign againſt Hannibal: Polybius, Plutarch, and Appian, are produced as *collateral evidences*, but they ſpeak not a word of thoſe *Prodigies* which the Roman Hiſtorian relates at large.

9. But his hate to Moſes is immortal: Notwithſtanding all his Lordſhip's pretended contempt of him, as a Legiſlator, it looks as if, in his heart, he thought him a formidable Rival. Archbiſhop Tillotſon had attempted to defend the *Authenticity* of his writings, on this footing, *that the unbeliever would only give the ſame credit to them which he gives to every civil Hiſtorian.* His Lordſhip owns the demand to be reaſonable; and is willing to try his Brother Legiſlator, on theſe terms.

In order to this, he obſerves, "That "one condition of the Authenticity of "any human Hiſtory, and ſuch alone "(ſays he) we are to conſider in this

"place,

" place, is, that it contains nothing *re-*
" *pugnant to the experience of mankind.*
" Things repugnant to this experience are
" to be found in many that paſs however
" for authentic; in that of LIVY, for in-
" ſtance: but then theſe incredible anec-
" dotes ſtand by themſelves, as it were,
" and the hiſtory, may go on without
" them. But this is not the caſe of the
" Pentateuch, *nor of the other Books of the*
" *Old Teſtament.* Incredible anecdotes are
" not mentioned ſeldom and occaſionally
" in them: THE WHOLE HISTORY IS
" FOUNDED ON SUCH, it conſiſts of little
" elſe, and IF IT WERE NOT A HISTORY
" OF THEM, IT WOULD BE A HISTORY
" OF NOTHING [7]."

His Lordſhip's objection to the *Authenticity* of the Bible as a *civil hiſtory*, is, that it is full of *Miracles*: and, ſuppoſing the Defender of Revelation ready to reply, " So likewiſe is the Hiſtory of *Livy*; and " yet that does not deſtroy its credit;" he obviates the reply extremely well. There is an eſſential difference, ſays he, between the Miracles of MOSES and of LIVY. The Roman Hiſtorian's are de-

[7] Vol. iii. p. 279.

tached

tached pieces; they make no part of the ſubject, and are extraneous to it: But the Miracles of the Jewiſh writer are intimately related to all the civil affairs, and make a neceſſary and inſeparable part; *the whole hiſtory is founded on them.* Take away LIVY's miracles, and the train of civil events *goes on* juſt as well *without them*: Take away MOSES's, and his hiſtory becomes a heap of confuſion, or, more properly, *it is a hiſtory of nothing*.

I am proud of any opportunity to acknowledge the obligations which Learning or Religion have to his Lordſhip; I only wiſh the occaſions had been more frequent. As it is, I am unwilling to let the firſt that occurred to me paſs by without my thanks, leſt the occaſion ſhould never return.

In a word, his Lordſhip's obſervation on the *difference* between the MIRACLES in MOSES and in LIVY, is ſolid and maſterly. And *this difference*, let me obſerve, is a certain mark, tho' not of that *civil authenticity* which the good Archbiſhop's argument requires, Yet of that *divine original* which the SCRIPTURES arrogate to themſelves.

It

It is the ſpecious, but trite, objection of infidelity againſt the *Miracles* recorded there, that thoſe remote ages were full of prodigies and portents. Why then, ſays the Freethinker, ſhould we believe the *incredible anecdotes* of MOSES, rather than thoſe of LIVY? For a very good reaſon, replies his Lordſhip, we find them in a hiſtory eſſentially different from that of *Livy*. Take away *his* miracles, together with all thoſe of the other pagan Hiſtorians, and the Story ſtands juſt as it did. But take away the BIBLE-MIRACLES, and you reduce the civil part of the relation to a ſtate of inexplicable confuſion.

Again, one of the leaſt hacknied, and indeed leaſt futile, obſervations I have ever heard urged againſt the Bible, (and it has been urged to me) is the WANT OF A NECESSARY CONNEXION between the *civil* and the *miraculous* parts of that Hiſtory. Here again his Lordſhip comes in, in ſupport of Revelation, and ſays, that this *neceſſary connexion* is evident to all, for that nothing can be made of the *civil* part, if you take away the *miraculous*. Which ſure is a *connexion* of ſome ſtrength.

Thus

Thus has his Lordſhip, before he was aware, in attempting to deſtroy the *civil authenticity* of the Bible, ſupported its *divine original*. And this good, tho' undeſigned, ought however to be acknowledged. But you may think, perhaps, that a matter of this importance, is not here ſufficiently developed. Without doubt, it is not. This is a long ſtory; and as I pretend to have ſupplied this DESIDERATUM, *The want of a connexion between the miraculous and civil part of the ſacred Hiſtory*, I ſhall refer you to the proper place, where you may ſee it at large.

In the mean time give me leave to go on with his Lordſhip; And proceed to the propoſition itſelf, That the *Bible Miracles deſtroy its credit as a civil hiſtory*. Now this I apprehend to be a pure piece of chicane. Let us ſee how the matter ſtands between the Archbiſhop and his Lordſhip.

BELIEVERS ſay, the Bible-Hiſtory is the hiſtory of a Diſpenſation really divine: UNBELIEVERS ſay, it is the hiſtory of one only pretended; and endeavour to ſupport their aſſertion, by ſhewing it to have the civil

marks

marks of falſehood and impoſture. Here the Archbiſhop ſteps forward and ſays, that he is willing the authenticity of the Bible ſhould be tried on the Standard of a CIVIL Hiſtory. Agreed, replies his Lordſhip; And what ſay you now to MIRACLES? Say? Why, that *miracles* are out of the queſtion; and come not into conſideration till the DIVINE authority be contended for. When we agreed to conſider the Bible as a *civil hiſtory only*, it was not for *truth's*, but for *argument's* ſake. If we held the Writers of it to be mere civil Hiſtorians, the *miracles*, recorded in it, might be fairly urged againſt us; and urged with advantage, if indeed there be that difference between them and *Livy's*, which is pretended. But as we hold the Writers were indeed inſpired, You, my Lord, have ſhewn us, by that difference, to juſtify the *miraculous part*, whenever their inſpiration becomes a queſtion between us. In the mean time, ſtick to your point, and never fancy you can make our Divines the dupes of ſo pitiful a Sophiſm. You have drawn us, while we argue a particular *queſtion* with you, to exclude one of our principles; and then urge againſt *that queſtion*, a FACT,

which

which ſtands upon the excluded principle, and ſo cannot be defended while the principle remains excluded: Which is juſt, as if, when you had perſuaded us to tye our *hands*, on promiſe that the queſtion ſhould be only about the *uſe of our feet*, You ſhould object to us our inability of laying faſt hold upon you. Your own words, my Lord, where you puſh this imaginary advantage, beſt detect the fraud and impoſture of your proceeding. "The "Old Teſtament (you ſay) is founded in "incredibility. Almoſt every event con-"tained in it, is incredible in its cauſes and "conſequences; and I muſt except or "reject the whole, as I ſaid juſt now. "No one, EXCEPT HERE AND THERE A "DIVINE, will preſume to ſay, that the "hiſtories of the old Teſtament are *con-*"*formable to the experience of Mankind*, "and the natural courſe of things."

Except here and there a Divine, do you ſay? Nor they neither, I aſſure your Lordſhip. What they ſay is this, That every thing of a mere *civil nature* in the Old Teſtament has all the marks of *civil anthenticity*. This is all they ſaid,

and

and all they meant to ſay. And, on what good grounds they ſaid it, give me leave to ſhew your Lordſhip a little more at large.

The Bible tells us, the world was created in time; and the time at no immenſe diſtance, as ſeveral fabulous relations of pagan Antiquity had pretended. — And does not the late invention of Arts prove that the Bible ſays nothing but what appears very probable?

It ſays, the Earth was overflowed by a deluge of waters.—And do not the contents of its ſurface demonſtrate that ſuch has been its fate?

The Bible ſays, again, that the *Founders of Cities* were the *inventers of arts*; that the firſt *civil* Governments aroſe from the *Domeſtic*, and compoſed ſmall Monarchies.—And do not experience and the natural courſe of things ſupport this *credible anecdote*?

The Pentateuch informs us, that the Iſraelites, after a long abode in Egypt, went out as a great People, and in an hoſtile manner, to ſeek new habitations.—Of this your Lordſhip may have both external and

inter-

internal evidence. The *external* are the Egyptian, Phœnician, Chaldee, and Greek Writers, quoted by Joſephus and Euſebius: the *internal* is the whole Jewiſh RITUAL.

Scripture relates the defection of the ten tribes to Idolatry, their tranſportation to a foreign land, and the repeopling that part of Judea with a new Colony of Idolaters.—And of the truth of all this, we ſay, the Samaritan Pentateuch, yet exiſting, is a ſtrong and amazing Witneſs.

Theſe, my Lord, are a very few of the numerous inſtances which might be produced to ſhew the *civil Authenticity* of the Bible. And on theſe and ſuch as theſe, the Clergy's challenge ſtood, when they undertook to prove *that Authenticity*, on the common principles of hiſtoric credit. And further, or other than this, they neither ſaid nor meant to ſay. They underſtood, as well as your Lordſhip, the difference between Moſes's miracles and thoſe of Livy; that the Jewiſh Hiſtory, unlike to all other, is *wholely founded on miracles*. But they diſtinguiſhed better than your Lordſhip, of Moſes' civil Hiſtory: which conſiſts of two parts; the peculiar

Diſpenſation to that people, and their tranſactions with their neighbours; and the occaſional ſtory of the reſt of mankind.

It is the firſt only to which his Lordſhip's obſervation can be applied, *viz.* that the *civil* cannot be ſeparated from the *miraculous* part: Nor did the clergy attempt it. It was the other, we muſt needs ſuppoſe, to which the Archbiſhop's challenge referred: And I have ſhewn juſt above, that we are able to make it good.

Thus would I have reaſoned with his Lordſhip; and thus, in fact was he reaſoned with, (as I may have occaſion to tell you in my next *Letter)* but he was deaf to all adviſe, tho' it was given in private, and to ſave his memory from the diſgrace of theſe portentous ESSAYS. What remained was to expoſe them, as they deſerved, to the laughter and contempt of mankind.

And now, Sir, I think I have pretty well diſcharged my general promiſe to You. When one looks back upon this ſtrange collection of poor meagre, disjointed, reaſoning, tied together, in a ſort, by his Syſtem, and ſwelled up, to look like ſubſtance, by the tumor of his Rhetoric, it

puts us in mind of the old ſtory of Prometheus; and we ſee his Lordſhip inſulting the ſanctity of the PUBLIC, juſt as that moſt antient of Freethinkers did the ALTAR OF JUPITER; on which, as the Poets tell us, he offered up to the King of Gods and Men, A HEAP OF DRY BONES COVERED WITH FAT.

I am, &c.

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